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REVIEWS 
 
An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current 
Corporate Reorganization Practice 
Kenneth Ayotte† & David A. Skeel, Jr.†† 
Courting Failure 
Lynn M. LoPucki. Michigan, 2005. Pp xii, 322. 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-two years ago, a young law professor named Lynn LoPucki 
published an empirical study that offered a startling insight into corpo-
rate reorganization practice under the then recently enacted 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code.1 The new Code gave corporate debtors and their managers 
so many protections, LoPucki concluded, that creditors were stymied and 
debtors were in “full control.”2 The article became a minor classic—
identifying many of the effects that would figure prominently in subse-
quent debates over whether Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was too 
debtor-friendly—and it inaugurated LoPucki’s career as a leading corpo-
rate reorganization theorist and empiricist.  
During the decade that followed, Professor LoPucki and his col-
league Bill Whitford conducted a mammoth empirical examination of, 
to use the phrase that recurred in the titles of the many articles the 
study produced, “the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held 
                                                                                                                      
 † Assistant Professor, Columbia Business School. 
†† S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
We are grateful to Neil Komesar, Lynn LoPucki, and Bob Rasmussen for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts; and Skeel thanks the University of Pennsylvania Law School for generous 
summer funding. 
1  Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code?: First Installment, 57 Am Bankr L J 99, 103 (1983) (finding that, after three 
years of enactment, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 was severely deficient and left too many large 
firms to fail again after emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, largely due to the inappropriate 
amount of control maintained by the debtor during the process), citing Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978, Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549 (1978), codified at 11 USC § 101 et seq (2000 & Supp 2005). 
 2 LoPucki, 57 Am Bankr L J at 103 (cited in note 1); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full 
Control—Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?: Second Installment, 57 Am 
Bankr L J 247, 272–73 (1983) (continuing the analysis with a focus on the ineffectiveness and 
underutilization of creditor committees). 
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companies.”3 The studies were based on an examination of the records 
of the largest cases filed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with 
interviews of more than a hundred bankruptcy lawyers, judges, and 
professionals. The project yielded many important findings, such as the 
authors’ discovery that managers were frequently replaced before the 
end of Chapter 11 cases,4 that managers often focused on creditors’ 
interests rather than shareholders’,5 and that most large companies 
sold a substantial portion of their assets during the case.6 LoPucki and 
Whitford also noticed that large companies seemed to engage in 
venue shopping, with many filing for Chapter 11 in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, even if those companies had little discernible con-
nection to New York.7   
In subsequent years, LoPucki has written on a wide variety of is-
sues, many (though by no means all)8 at least indirectly connected to 
the corporate reorganization studies for which he is best known, and 
many drawing on the comprehensive database of large corporate re-
organization cases that he has constructed and made available on his 
website.9 Particularly as compared to the usual scholarly fare, LoPucki’s 
                                                                                                                      
 3 See, for example, Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 Cornell L Rev 597, 597 (1993) (drawing 
from an empirical study to describe then-current large firm bankruptcy case outcomes and 
evaluate the feasibility of alternatives); Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Corporate 
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U Pa L 
Rev 669, 694–715, 742–47 (1993) (describing the relative power of shareholders and creditors and 
finding that the latter have too much influence over the managers of bankrupt companies); Lynn 
M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reor-
ganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U Pa L Rev 125, 126 (1990) (reporting the 
results of an empirical study finding that the absolute priority rule had been abandoned in favor 
of more individualized decisionmaking). 
 4 See LoPucki and Whitford, 78 Cornell L Rev at 612 (cited in note 3).  
 5 See LoPucki and Whitford, 141 U Pa L Rev at 745 (cited in note 3). 
 6 See LoPucki and Whitford, 78 Cornell L Rev at 601 (cited in note 3). 
 7 See Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in 
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis L Rev 11, 15 (argu-
ing that forum shopping was corrupting the bankruptcy process, with firms filing in jurisdictions 
where case law was more favorable to the failing firms or to their attorneys, even in the absence 
of a meaningful presence there). 
 8 In one of the best known articles that does not draw on the reorganization data, though 
its themes figure briefly in Courting Failure (p 55), LoPucki argues that states and offshore ha-
vens have made it increasingly easy for wealthy individuals (often doctors who fear malpractice 
liability) and corporations to put their assets beyond the reach of creditors by passing laws au-
thorizing devices such as asset protection trusts. An individual who sets up an asset protection 
trust transfers her assets to the trust in the hope that the trust will be deemed off limits to her 
creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L J 1, 23–30 (1996). 
 9 Lynn M. LoPucki, Lynn M. LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database (2002), online at 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm (visited Jan 17, 2006). It includes data on every large Chap-
ter 11 case (currently defined as cases with assets of at least $220 million) filed since 1980. By 
providing both open access to the database, and the specific data used in his projects, LoPucki 
has been extraordinarily generous. We and many other researchers are greatly in his debt. 
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articles are colorful, well-written, and often designed to provoke. In 
the past five years, much of his time and invective have been devoted 
to a single controversy: the debate over court shopping by large cor-
porate debtors. From a measured observer of the court shopping phe-
nomenon, LoPucki has evolved into an increasingly vocal critic, direct-
ing much of his criticism at the bankruptcy court in Delaware, which 
displaced New York in the 1990s as the venue of choice. Debtors’ 
managers and lawyers look for a court that will favor these “case plac-
ers’” interests, he argues, so Delaware, eager to garner the accompany-
ing prestige and local revenues, bends the bankruptcy process to the will 
of the managers and lawyers in order to attract cases.10 
Courting Failure is the crowning achievement of this recent work, 
combining LoPucki’s court shopping data and a seemingly unrelated 
sequence of articles on international insolvency cases into a single, 
sustained jeremiad against bankruptcy venue shopping (pp 252–59). 
Professor LoPucki has shared his outrage with everyone who will lis-
ten, and a large number of people have done just that—including 
many politicians in Washington. During the debates on major bank-
ruptcy legislation in Spring 2005, Texas Senator John Cornyn de-
scribed venue shopping as  
a problem that has been well documented by scholars in the field, 
most recently in a comprehensive book [just published] by UCLA 
law professor Lynn M. LoPucki . . . . 
The professor has documented instances of forum shopping by 
corporate debtors that have harmed consumers and workers in 
virtually all of our [s]tates.11  
Senator Cornyn was persuaded to withdraw an anti–venue shopping 
amendment he had proposed, but the proposal continues to linger in 
Congress. 
While there is a great deal to admire in Courting Failure, the in-
dictment and proposed reforms are based on two crucially flawed as-
sumptions that cause LoPucki to misdiagnose what works and what 
doesn’t in Chapter 11. First, Courting Failure seems to assume that the 
                                                                                                                      
 10 LoPucki’s first foray into forum shopping offered cautious praise for the phenomenon 
and considerable criticism of its abuses. LoPucki and Whitford, 1991 Wis L Rev at 50 (cited in 
note 7) (arguing that the abuses of forum shopping could be checked without abandoning its 
positive competitive advantages). His subsequent articles became increasingly critical, although 
interestingly, none argued that the venue rules should be changed. Only in Courting Failure itself 
has LoPucki argued that corporate debtors should be prevented from filing for bankruptcy in 
Delaware (pp 252–54) (proposing that the state of incorporation should no longer provide a 
venue option). 
 11 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S 256, 109th Cong, 
1st Sess (Mar 2, 2005), in 151 Cong Rec S 1892, 1902 (Supp Mar 2, 2005). 
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goal of every large Chapter 11 case is, and should be, to rescue the 
company and thoroughly restructure its operations in order to mini-
mize the likelihood that the company will ever need to return to 
Chapter 11 again. This assumption is hardwired into the design of 
LoPucki’s empirical analysis, and it drives all of his interpretations of 
his data. It is also, in our view, mistaken. Drawing on the corporate 
finance literature, we argue that an intensive, costly restructuring is 
not always the optimal strategy when a company files for Chapter 11. 
To the contrary, under a variety of plausible conditions, a quick, low-
cost procedure (which we refer to as a “workout”) may be more effi-
cient than a costly restructuring. Indeed, we show that a subsequent 
liquidation or return to Chapter 11 may confirm the efficiency of for-
going an intensive reorganization the first time around, rather than 
reflect a failure of the system, as LoPucki assumes. 
Second, Professor LoPucki’s condemnation of corporate debtors’ 
tendency to file in Delaware and New York rather than in other loca-
tions ignores several significant checks on the ability of a debtor’s 
managers and attorneys to pick a venue that favors their interests over 
those of other constituencies. First, and most important in many cases, is 
the debtor-in-possession (DIP) financer. The rise of the DIP financer—
and the phenomenon critics refer to as “creditor-in-possession”—is the 
single most remarkable omission from Courting Failure. DIP financers 
exert significant control over the case, and they are unlikely to permit 
the debtor to choose a bankruptcy venue that undermines the DIP 
financer’s interests. In addition, the debtor’s proposed reorganization 
plan is subjected to a creditor vote, and open auction procedures often 
can protect creditors’ interests in cases that involve a sale of assets. 
After critiquing Professor LoPucki’s analysis in theoretical terms, 
we bring our own empirical findings to bear on the venue shopping 
debate. Our data suggest that the debtors that choose Delaware ap-
pear to be drawn by the Delaware court’s experience in handling large 
Chapter 11 cases, and that companies that have substantial secured 
credit are more likely to file in Delaware.12 We also reexamine 
LoPucki’s data, and find that the cases he views as smoking guns, 
demonstrating Delaware’s failure, cannot sustain the interpretation he 
projects on them. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief, chapter-
by-chapter summary of Courting Failure. We begin our critique in Part 
II, which focuses on LoPucki’s evidence that a disproportionate per-
centage of Delaware debtors wound up back in bankruptcy in the 1990s, 
that the Delaware firms performed poorly in the interim, and that this 
                                                                                                                      
 12 The statistical analysis is reported and explained in Part III.B. 
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reflected a failure of the bankruptcy system. In addition to casting 
doubt on Professor LoPucki’s empirical findings, this Part develops a 
simple model to explore the choice between an intrusive restructuring 
and a less costly workout under conditions of uncertainty. Part III ex-
plores the checks that limit a debtor’s managers’ and lawyers’ ability 
to choose a bankruptcy venue based solely on their own interests. To-
gether, Parts II and III offer an efficiency explanation for the distinc-
tive qualities of Delaware reorganization and describe several checks 
on pernicious court shopping that tend to support the efficiency view. 
In Part IV, we argue that the real question in current reorganiza-
tion practice is whether the recent shift to DIP lender control is effi-
cient or problematic. Although the advent of DIP lender control gen-
erally seems to have improved Chapter 11, there are several contexts 
where DIP lenders may divert value from other creditors. Rather than 
altering the venue rules to prevent troubled debtors from filing for 
bankruptcy in Delaware, we argue, it makes more sense to focus on 
the potential distortions created by DIP lender control. 
I.  THE EVER EXPANDING GYRE: LOPUCKI’S INDICTMENT 
“Turning and turning in the widening gyre,” W.B. Yeats writes at 
the start of his poem “The Second Coming,” 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming!13 
The vision is apocalyptic: ever-expanding chaos, a world spiraling 
out of control as the voices of integrity are overtaken by an unstoppa-
ble surge of corruption. 
The same sense of impending disaster infuses almost every page 
of Courting Failure. LoPucki is convinced that the bankruptcy system 
is shot through with corruption. The corruption, as he sees it, stems 
from competition by bankruptcy judges to attract high profile cases, 
and it has rippled ever outward, poisoning everything in its path. 
                                                                                                                      
 13 W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming (1921), in The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats 187 (Col-
lier 6th ed 1989) (Richard J. Finneran, ed). 
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LoPucki sets the tone at the very outset, by revisiting (in the Pro-
logue) a classic muckraking article by Lincoln Steffens that detailed 
New Jersey’s efforts to entice the nation’s largest businesses to incor-
porate in New Jersey.14 By giving the corporations whatever they 
wanted, and aggressively marketing its intent to do so, New Jersey 
raised so much money through the taxes it charged corporations for 
the privilege of flying under the New Jersey banner that its governor 
could proudly report in 1904 that “[o]f the entire income of the gov-
ernment, not a penny was contributed directly by the people” (p 4).15 
In 1913, when then–New Jersey governor (and President-elect) Wood-
row Wilson proposed seven bills designed to ratchet up the state’s an-
titrust scrutiny, numerous New Jersey corporations fled in terror to 
Delaware, which then took over as the leading state of incorporation 
and has retained that mantle ever since. LoPucki’s implicit claims—
made explicit in the chapters that follow—are that Delaware has played 
the same role in bankruptcy, and that the behavior of Delaware’s judges 
has had a cancerous effect on the bankruptcy system. 
Following the Introduction, which suggests that competition (in 
this case by the Southern District of New York) to attract high profile 
cases enabled Enron’s Ken Lay to sidestep significant prosecution,16 
LoPucki briefly recounts the history of bankruptcy venue competition 
in the first three chapters of the book. Chapter 1 traces the competi-
tion to an innocent-looking statutory provision. Under bankruptcy’s 
venue rule, a troubled debtor can file for bankruptcy in any district 
where: (1) the debtor’s headquarters are located, (2) the debtor’s prin-
cipal assets are, (3) an affiliate has filed for bankruptcy, or (4) the 
debtor is domiciled.17 In the 1980s, the third option created much of 
the excitement. Attracted by the sophistication of New York’s judges 
as well as their prodebtor orientation and generous fee awards for the 
debtor’s lawyers, many of the largest corporate debtors wanted to file 
their cases in New York but didn’t have their headquarters, major as-
sets, or domicile in the Big Apple. So long as one of the company’s 
subsidiaries, no matter how small, had already filed for bankruptcy in 
                                                                                                                      
 14 Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, Part II: How She Sold Out the United States, 
McClure’s 41 (May 1905). Indeed, the innuendo begins before the first page of Courting Failure. 
Facing the Prologue, as an opening epigraph, is the ethical requirement that “A Judge Shall 
Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities” (p xii). 
The implication is that the nation’s bankruptcy judges are behaving in an unethical fashion.  
 15 Quoted in Steffens, McClure’s at 51 (cited in note 14). 
 16 It is perhaps worth noting that this is a dubious claim. Lay has faced an avalanche of 
litigation, and his criminal trial is scheduled to begin in January 2006. See, for example, Trial of 2 
Enron Executives Is Set for January, NY Times C12 (Feb 25, 2005); Simon Romero, Satisfaction 
and Sadness at the Sight of Handcuffs, NY Times C4 (July 9, 2004). 
 17 28 USC § 1408 (2000 & Supp 2005). 
File: 19.Ayotte (final) Created on: 1/27/2006 11:32 AM Last Printed: 1/31/2006 2:39 PM 
2006] Efficiency-Based Explanation for Corporate Reorganization Practice 431 
New York, the whole company could follow its affiliate. LoPucki re-
counts how Eastern Airlines filed for bankruptcy in New York on the 
coattails of Ionosphere, Inc., which ran Eastern’s hospitality rooms at 
airports and had less than $2 million in assets (p 36).18 
Delaware enters the stage in Chapter 2. After a scathing overview 
of Delaware’s efforts to attract credit card companies and major cor-
porations, LoPucki recounts Delaware’s rise to prominence as the 
premier district for large scale reorganization in the 1990s. Reluctant 
to file for bankruptcy in New York (because of a recent ruling involv-
ing corporate bonds) or Houston (fearing the bankruptcy court might 
be influenced by local labor unrest in the wake of an earlier bank-
ruptcy), Continental filed in Delaware, whose only bankruptcy judge, 
Judge Helen Balick, had recently ruled that a company’s state of in-
corporation is its “domicile” for venue purposes.19 The bankruptcy 
proceeded smoothly, and Delaware quickly displaced New York as the 
district of choice for major bankruptcies. LoPucki attributes the shift 
to prodebtor rulings by Judge Balick and her willingness to “rubber-
stamp” prepackaged bankruptcy cases that were prenegotiated and 
then filed in Delaware.20 She gave the “case placers”—principally the 
debtor’s managers and attorneys—what they wanted, in LoPucki’s 
view, so corporate America came back for more. 
LoPucki completes the brief historical tour in the chapter that 
follows. Entitled “The Federal Government Strikes Back,” Chapter 3 
describes the growing hostility to Delaware’s dominant share of the 
largest bankruptcy cases. In 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission proposed, among many other recommendations, that 
state of incorporation be eliminated as a venue option (p 80). At about 
the same time, a Judicial Conference report alleging that Judge Balick 
had engaged in ex parte conversations with bankruptcy lawyers fur-
ther roiled the waters, and is thought to have induced Delaware Dis-
trict Court Judge Joseph Farnan to take control of the assignment of 
Delaware’s bankruptcy cases, by withdrawing the automatic “refer-
                                                                                                                      
 18 Another company, Tacoma Boatbuilding, rented a small office in New York and declared 
this to be the company’s headquarters (p 32). 
 19 From the late 1930s to the 1970s, corporate domicile was excluded as a bankruptcy 
venue, largely to prevent corporate debtors from bringing their cases to Delaware. In the 1970s, 
the domicile option was reintroduced, first as a rule change and then in connection with the new 
Bankruptcy Code. The history is recounted in David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bank-
ruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 Del L Rev 1, 5–17 (1998). 
 20 In a prepackaged bankruptcy, or prepack, the debtor and its major creditors negotiate 
the terms of the reorganization before filing for bankruptcy, and submit a proposed reorganiza-
tion along with or shortly after the initial Chapter 11 petition. See Robert K. Rasmussen and 
Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 
Nw U L Rev 1357, 1374–76 (2000) (suggesting that Delaware’s lead in bankruptcies is especially 
strong in prepackaged bankruptcies, where Delaware’s law is far more favorable to debtors). 
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ence” of the cases to the bankruptcy court (pp 80–87). During this 
same period, Delaware was a victim of its own success, attracting more 
major cases than the court—even after the addition of a second judge 
in 1993—could handle. LoPucki describes Delaware’s decision to 
bring in outside judges to handle some of the cases and accuses Dela-
ware of yanking cases from one visiting judge—Judge Randall 
Newsome—when he questioned whether several of the cases really 
belonged in Delaware (pp 94–95). 
For those reading Courting Failure as a breathless tale of judicial 
intrigue, Chapter 4, which shifts from history to data, will come as 
something of a letdown. But it is the single most important chapter in 
the book—the chapter that attempts to make LoPucki’s case that 
bankruptcy judges’ efforts to attract major cases have perverted the 
bankruptcy system.  
Chapter 4 begins by recounting LoPucki’s discovery that many of 
the large corporate debtors who reorganized in Delaware in the 1990s 
required a second trip to the bankruptcy court within a few years.21 For 
LoPucki, the repeat filings—known in bankruptcy circles as “Chapter 
22s”—demonstrate that Delaware’s judges made a deal with the devil: 
in order to attract big cases, the judges simply confirmed any reor-
ganization plan that was presented to them, without providing any 
meaningful scrutiny of its terms. To defend this thesis, LoPucki turns 
to his scholarly critics, rejecting a series of alternative explanations 
that have been offered to explain the high number of repeat filings in 
Delaware.22 One such alternative explanation is that the repeat filings 
                                                                                                                      
 21 The discovery was reported in Lynn M. LoPucki and Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public 
Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bot-
tom,” 54 Vand L Rev 231, 235, 249–50 (2001), which found that nearly one-third (ten of thirty-
one overall, and nine of thirty that emerged after 1990) of the large debtors reorganized in 
Delaware during the period of the study later filed for Chapter 11 a second time. LoPucki re-
fined and further defended the analysis in Lynn M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal 
Regimes? A Response to Professors Rasmussen, Thomas, and Skeel, 54 Vand L Rev 331, 333–38 
(2001), and Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 Vand L Rev 1933, 1939 (2002).  
 22 Among the articles LoPucki responds to here and elsewhere are several by one of us, 
see generally David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad about Delaware?, 54 Vand L Rev 309 (2001) 
(arguing that firms experience a real increase in value upon reincorporating in Delaware and 
that the high bankruptcy refiling rate there is not an indication of its state’s courts’ failures); 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U Cin L 
Rev 1243 (2000) (arguing that Delaware venue in bankruptcy offers some (though not all) of the 
benefits Delaware offers in corporate law); Skeel, 1 Del L Rev 1 (cited in note 19), and several 
by Bob Rasmussen and Randall Thomas, see generally Robert K. Rasmussen and Randall S. 
Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 54 Vand L Rev 283 (2001) (criticizing earlier critiques of Delaware’s bankruptcy 
practice, noting a need to consider prepackaged bankruptcies separately from more traditional 
bankruptcies, a need to assess failure beyond just refiling, and a need to question whether all 
refilings are negative events); Rasmussen and Thomas, 94 Nw U L Rev 1357 (cited in note 20). 
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may reflect a decision by the parties that a quick, low-cost restructur-
ing makes more sense than a costly, time-consuming restructuring, 
despite the higher risk of a subsequent default. In response to this ar-
gument, LoPucki marshals data (from a concededly small study) sug-
gesting that companies filing prepackaged bankruptcies and subse-
quently failing or refiling suffered substantial losses in the interim (pp 
108–10). Nor, he argues, are the companies that file for bankruptcy in 
Delaware more complex or different in other ways from non-
Delaware cases: they actually emerge from bankruptcy with fewer 
classes of creditors, not more, than companies that reorganize else-
where, and the other variables that LoPucki considers do not reveal 
further differences between Delaware and non-Delaware cases. The 
obvious explanation for these findings, LoPucki concludes, is that 
Delaware debtors reorganize too quickly and not thoroughly enough. 
Whereas companies reorganizing elsewhere “solved their profitability 
problems” in bankruptcy, Delaware debtors did not (p 117). 
With the four chapters that comprise most of the second half of 
the book, the breathless tone returns; the gyre starts to spin ever 
faster, widening from Delaware to encompass the entire U.S. bank-
ruptcy system and then the entire world. In Chapter 5, LoPucki argues 
that the court competition spread well beyond Delaware and New 
York in the late 1990s, infecting courts across the nation. The bank-
ruptcy courts in Houston, Dallas, and other cities began to compete by 
copying many of the attributes that seemed to attract big cases to 
Delaware: they granted New York rates to bankruptcy professionals 
and gave debtors much more flexibility with so-called first day orders. 
Perhaps the biggest winner was Chicago, which, during the corporate 
scandals, attracted Conseco, Kmart, and United Airlines before sev-
eral subsequent appellate court rulings seemed to dampen its popular-
ity. In Chapter 6, “Corruption,” LoPucki argues that court competition 
has corrupted courts’ handling of seven major issues in bankruptcy: 
(1) professional fees are out of control and are now paid on a monthly 
basis to keep the professionals happy, (2) failed managers are permit-
ted to keep their jobs, (3) courts’ failure to appoint a trustee—in the 
Enron case in particular—has helped corporate thieves keep their 
money, (4) managers are allowed to pay themselves lucrative reten-
tion bonuses, (5) courts simply rubberstamp prepackaged bankrupt-
cies, (6) courts permit debtors to give special treatment to favored 
vendors, and (7) courts close their eyes and permit companies to sell 
the businesses quickly under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather 
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than require the debtor to propose a reorganization plan and submit 
the sale to a vote of the company’s creditors and shareholders.23  
In Chapter 7, “The Competition Goes Global,” LoPucki argues 
that Delaware and New York reached out to claim jurisdiction in sev-
eral major international insolvencies involving foreign companies with 
a small presence in the United States. “The mere fact that so many [of 
these] cases go forward in the United States without active opposi-
tion,” he concludes, “does more to prove the effectiveness of U.S. in-
timidation than the superiority of Chapter 11” (p 189).  
By Chapter 8, the gyre is spinning even faster; court competition 
may now be “Global and Out of Control.” LoPucki acknowledges that 
the forum shopping risk he fears most—that “an international shopper 
can access an entirely different set of remedies and priorities” if it’s 
not satisfied with its home country’s rules—is “held in check” by the 
ability of the local country’s courts “to nullify the attempt by refusing 
to recognize or enforce the overreaching courts’ orders” (p 207). But 
he argues that scholars have, with increasing success, been pushing 
international initiatives that would replace the traditional “territorial” 
approach to international insolvency cases with a more “universalist” 
approach. Under territorialism, the insolvency laws of any country 
where a financially troubled company has assets control the disposi-
tion of those assets. Under universalism, by contrast, the laws of one 
country—the location of the debtor’s headquarters or principal assets, 
or a location identified by the company in its charter—would dictate 
the entire process. Universalism, LoPucki warns, would encourage on 
an international level the same forum shopping that has corrupted the 
United States bankruptcy system. Companies could manipulate the 
choice of forum—moving their headquarters, for instance, if the laws of 
the country where a debtor is headquartered control—and courts 
would compete to attract large international insolvencies in the same 
way United States courts have competed to lure United States debtors.  
In Chapter 9 LoPucki shifts back to a somewhat more academic 
mode, and returns to the question of whether Delaware’s competitive 
success is beneficial or pernicious. The chapter begins by summarizing 
the longstanding debate whether Delaware’s preeminence as a state 
of incorporation reflects a “race to the top” or a “race to the bottom,” 
and attributes Delaware’s popularity to “network effects” (that is, 
                                                                                                                      
 23 For a powerful, issue-by-issue critique of LoPucki’s seven examples of ostensible corrup-
tion, see Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt (unpublished manuscript 2005) (on file 
with authors) (pointing out that several of LoPucki’s claims are misleading and several of the 
current bankruptcy practices that LoPucki criticizes are defensible). It is also worth noting that 
several of the issues here have been affected by the recent bankruptcy reforms. Most impor-
tantly, 11 USC § 503(c) (Supp 2005) imposes strict new limits on retention bonuses. 
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companies choose Delaware because so many other companies have 
already done so) rather than any superiority of Delaware lawmaking 
or judicial oversight. But even if Delaware’s role in corporate law 
were beneficial, LoPucki argues, the Delaware bankruptcy courts can-
not be defended in the same terms. When corporations move to Dela-
ware, they still must answer to shareholders and other constituencies. 
If the company is in financial distress, managers “have no reason to 
concern themselves with the interests or preferences of shareholders 
in selecting a court,” because shareholders cannot interfere with the 
decision and their interests are likely to be wiped out in bankruptcy (p 
241). Managers are therefore free to shop for the court that’s best for 
managers. 
Chapter 10, “Conclusions,” offers a final set of dire warnings. “If 
Congress allows the bankruptcy court competition to continue,” 
LoPucki predicts, “the substantive changes already visible in the com-
peting courts’ practices will accelerate. To the extent that the courts 
have placed any limits on incumbent managers’ pay, authority, or job 
security, the courts will remove them” (p 250). The only hope, in 
LoPucki’s view, is to eliminate court competition in one of two ways. 
First, Congress could remove state of incorporation and filing by an 
affiliate as bases for venue. A pared down venue provision, which re-
quired debtors to look to the location of their headquarters or princi-
pal assets, would sharply reduce court shopping (p 252).24 Alterna-
tively, “Congress might establish specialized bankruptcy courts at 
three or four locations in the United States to handle only the largest 
cases,” each to cover a separate region (p 253). Unless lawmakers in-
tervene in one of these ways, LoPucki concludes, court competition 
will spiral even further out of control. 
Like many muckraking stories, Courting Failure is great fun to 
read—at least if the reader isn’t one of the groups, such as bankruptcy 
judges, who are accused of corruption in its pages.25 The story is fast-
paced and engagingly written, and LoPucki spices up his tour through 
the arcane world of bankruptcy with colorful examples. As with much 
classic muckraking, the argument often proceeds by implication and 
innuendo. The fact that the bankruptcy court did not appoint a trustee 
                                                                                                                      
 24 As LoPucki concedes, companies could still forum shop by moving their headquarters to 
the desired location. But he concludes (somewhat in tension with his warnings about interna-
tional forum shopping through headquarters changes) that “such shoppers would not exist in 
sufficient numbers to corrupt courts that hoped to attract them” (p 252). 
 25 LoPucki has continued to sound the corruption theme in commentary written since 
Courting Failure appeared. See, for example, Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘Corruption’ is the Right Word, 44 
Bankr Ct Dec: Weekly News & Comment A7 (July 19, 2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy 
Bingo, Forbes 44 (July 4, 2005). 
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in Enron’s bankruptcy means that courts compete for cases by letting 
tainted executives off the hook (no mention that Ken Lay has been a 
defendant in numerous civil suits and is awaiting a criminal trial). The 
fact that recent bankruptcy changes in England have made English 
insolvency slightly more like U.S. law means that England has been 
forced to compete with the U.S. bankruptcy courts. (In reality, the 
connection between the English reforms and United States venue 
competition was, if not wholly imaginary, a tiny factor in the push for 
reform.26) 
What made Steffens’s muckraking account of early New Jersey 
corporate law so compelling was an investigative reporting coup: 
Steffens found a prominent corporate lawyer who claimed to have 
dreamed up the strategy for attracting giant corporations, and who 
later had second thoughts about the forces he had unleashed. The 
power of LoPucki’s indictment stems from a very different source: 
data. The linchpin of LoPucki’s court competition story is his finding 
that a disproportionate percentage of Delaware reorganizations re-
quired a second Chapter 11 filing, together with the additional data he 
marshals in his effort to disprove more favorable interpretations of 
this finding. We therefore focus first on the empirical claims. 
II.  HAS LOPUCKI SHOWN A FAILURE IN DELAWARE? 
LoPucki’s analysis seems to leave little doubt that the Delaware 
bankruptcy court must have been inefficient. LoPucki concedes that 
Delaware reorganizations, particularly the prepackaged cases, are faster 
than reorganizations in other courts.27 But his data seem to suggest 
that this speed comes at a great cost. Firms choosing to file in Dela-
ware are more likely to file for bankruptcy again and to perform 
worse than other firms after reorganizing, particularly so for share-
holders of the reorganized Delaware firms.28 This leads to the conclu-
sion that judges in Delaware must have been too lax in scrutinizing 
plans, and that contracting parties themselves must have been un-
aware of this inefficiency, because such a pattern could not have been 
chosen voluntarily by rational profit-maximizing actors. 
                                                                                                                      
 26 For an overview of the recent reforms, see, for example, John Armour and Rizwaan 
Jameel Mokal, Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002, 32 
Lloyd’s Marit & Comm L Q 28 (2005). 
 27 In an earlier article, LoPucki argued that Delaware does not process cases faster than 
other courts “except by comparison to New York.” Theodore Eisenberg and Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganiza-
tions, 84 Cornell L Rev 967, 989–92 (1999). But other commentators, including us, have found 
statistically significant differences, and LoPucki’s subsequent work reaches a similar conclusion. 
 28 LoPucki reviews both the LoPucki and Kalin study (pp 98–102) and the LoPucki and 
Doherty study (pp 110–17) to support his conclusions. See also note 22 and accompanying text. 
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In the analysis that follows, we will show that most, if not all, of 
the patterns documented in the data and described in Courting Failure 
could arise from a model of rational venue choice—made in the inter-
ests of maximizing total firm value—in which means of distress resolu-
tion differ in their costs and effectiveness.29 The main contribution of 
this model is to demonstrate that all of the results ascribed to causal 
differences among courts (that is, that postbankruptcy outcome differ-
ences across courts were caused by deficiencies in the Delaware bank-
ruptcy process) could result from value-maximizing decisions that do 
not involve a causal role for bankruptcy courts. The choice of courts 
may well have been efficient, in other words, rather than pernicious.  
The model provides support for the notion that all of the patterns 
we see in the data could have resulted from a pure selection effect, 
with firms with preexisting differences selecting into distress resolu-
tion procedures that are best tailored to their circumstances. In this 
framework, the Delaware court (and prepackaged bankruptcy, regard-
less of venue) provides distressed firms with a forum to enact faster, 
and hence less costly, workout procedures when little would be gained 
by a long and expensive stay in Chapter 11.30 The Delaware option is 
valuable because it provides firms with more flexibility to resolve dis-
tress. In our model, this option is strictly welfare-enhancing for the 
capital providers of distressed firms.31 Because the model generates 
many of the seemingly negative outcomes we see in the data, we hope 
to convince the reader that the conclusions in Courting Failure that 
assign labels of inefficiency to the Delaware bankruptcy process are 
not justified and may well be wrong. 
                                                                                                                      
 29 The logic of the model developed in this Part draws extensively from the insights of 
Matthias Kahl. See generally Matthias Kahl, Economic Distress, Financial Distress, and Dynamic 
Liquidation, 57 J Fin 135 (2002). 
 30 LoPucki’s own research suggests that the direct costs of a Delaware bankruptcy are not 
less than those of bankruptcies elsewhere. Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The Deter-
minants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J Empirical Leg Stud 
111, 131 (2004). Even if this is correct, it is widely agreed (even by LoPucki himself) that direct 
costs are only a small portion of the costs of bankruptcy. Indirect costs loom much larger. See, for 
example, Robert H. Mnookin and Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: 
Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 Va L Rev 295, 313 (1989). 
 31 This is not to say that courts and judges do not differ with respect to their expertise and 
their ability to handle difficult cases. Nor do we suggest that the judges with the most expertise 
invariably make good decisions. We set all of these issues aside in the initial model to demon-
strate that having a choice of distress resolution procedures is valuable even if no differences 
among courts and judges exist. To the extent that some courts are more skilled than others, then 
venue choice becomes all the more valuable. 
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A. The Model 
Consider the following decision problem that a firm in financial 
(and potentially economic) distress faces.32 We will take as given for 
the moment that the firm’s decisionmakers (management) will volun-
tarily choose outcomes that maximize the collective expected payoff to 
the firm’s capital providers. Later, we will turn to the issue of agency 
problems between management and capital providers to understand 
how such issues might affect the firm’s capital structure decision after 
distress is resolved. This will introduce the concept of creditor control, 
which we will later argue is an essential piece of the analysis, one that 
has been left out thus far in the venue choice debate.33 
Consider a world with two dates, zero and one. At date zero, the 
firm is in financial distress and must choose between two forms of 
distress resolution. Under one option, which we will call “restructur-
ing,” the company takes costly actions to improve its operations, in 
addition to altering its capital structure. This may require selling off 
unprofitable divisions, replacing poor management, or investing in 
new capital improvements, all of which will take time and resources to 
complete successfully. Rather than expend these resources, however, 
the firm can instead pursue a less costly second option, which we will 
                                                                                                                      
 32 A firm that is in financial distress is unable to pay its debts but may otherwise be viable. 
A firm in economic distress is not viable and should be shut down. 
 33 The role of creditors in corporate governance is familiar to scholars who study govern-
ance in European and Asian countries. But it has long been omitted from analysis of American 
corporate governance. See, for example, John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins, and David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom, 55 Vand L Rev 1699, 1720–22, 1763–72 (2002) (discussing the similarities between 
corporate structure in the United States and in the United Kingdom and the differences in the 
bankruptcy laws of both—specifically the strong role of British creditors). Exceptions to this 
neglect include George G. Triantis and Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corpo-
rate Governance, 83 Cal L Rev 1073, 1080 (1995) (discussing the differing incentives of share-
holders and managers and how bankruptcy rules, through creditor actions, can provide share-
holders with information about managerial performance), and recent work by Douglas Baird 
and Bob Rasmussen. See generally Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt 
and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, U Pa L Rev (forthcoming 2006) (describing the 
widening powers of creditors, whose influence exceeds that of shareholders and who exercise 
great power in and out of bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 
at Twilight, 56 Stan L Rev 673 (2003) (providing an empirical background to the assertion that 
modern corporations are not served well by the assumptions underlying arcane bankruptcy law 
and arguing that creditors have too much power for Chapter 11 to be effective); Douglas G. 
Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan L Rev 751 (2002) (arguing that 
bankruptcy is no longer useful for reorganizations and instead is a vehicle for creditors to force 
liquidations because the modern corporation has little value as a going concern in comparison 
with the paradigmatic railroad). One of us has also written in this vein. See, for example, David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 Yale L J 1519, 1552–62 (2004) (examining creditor 
protections in corporate law and bankruptcy, and emphasizing the “active role that creditors play 
in corporate governance and the rules that facilitate this role”). 
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call a “workout.” This involves only a modification of the firm’s capital 
structure, such as a debt-for-equity swap or an exchange of existing 
debt for new debt that alleviates the firm’s liquidity shortage but does 
little to affect operations. To be concrete, suppose a restructuring costs 
R, while a workout costs W, where W < R.  
The difference between the less costly but less thorough “work-
out” option and the more costly but more thorough “restructuring” 
option can be thought of in two ways that are relevant to the current 
debate. The workout can be thought of as a prepackaged Chapter 11, 
while the restructuring can be thought of as a “full-blown” Chapter 
11.34 To interpret the model differently, within the category of “full-
blown” Chapter 11 cases, a Delaware reorganization (which is faster 
and thus less costly) is likely to resemble the workout option, while 
cases in other courts resemble the restructuring option.35 
The firm will face a nontrivial decision between the two options, 
because the firm’s future prospects, and hence the benefits from re-
structuring, are uncertain. Suppose there are three possible future 
states of the world, one of which will be realized at date one. The 
firm’s owners know only the probability distribution of the future 
states but do not know exactly which state will arise. We will refer to 
these states as good, medium, and bad (G, M, and B). Let’s first sup-
pose that the firm chooses to save the extra cost of restructuring, and 
chooses a workout. If the high state (state G) arises, which happens 
with probability pg, we suppose that the firm’s prospects improve sig-
nificantly. From date one forward, the firm will produce cash flows 
with a present value that, for simplicity, are equal to 1. If state M 
arises, with probability pm, the firm can return to health, but only if it 
undertakes the restructuring it passed up at date zero. Since this costs 
R (which we assume to be less than 1), the firm’s value in state M is 
given by 1 – R. If state B arises, however, with probability pb, the firm’s 
prospects have deteriorated to the point that a shutdown is efficient.36 
The shutdown will produce a small liquidation value L, where  
L < 1 – R. In addition to the future value of the firm realized at date 
one, we assume that the decision not to restructure results in losses 
equal to X between periods zero and one. 
                                                                                                                      
 34 See, for example, Rasmussen and Thomas, 54 Vand L Rev at 288–90, 295 (cited in note 
22) (making this distinction). 
 35 Of course, in reality a firm and its creditors could have an extended stay in Chapter 11 in 
the Delaware courts as well. The important assumption here in tying the model to the data is that 
the “Other Courts” do not allow for a fast bankruptcy, and will thus be avoided by the firms that 
would benefit from it. Because these firms are more likely to be economically distressed and will 
optimally choose higher leverage, the data that would result from a world of this kind might be 
mistakenly attributed to a faulty Delaware bankruptcy process. 
 36 Naturally, because there are only three future states, pg + pm + pb = 1. 
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If the firm chooses to spend the extra costs to restructure, on the 
other hand, three benefits arise. First, the firm improves between dates 
zero and one, so that the losses X are not realized.37 Second, the firm’s 
future cash flows increase in the states of the world in which the firm 
remains in operation (G and M). We suppose this restructuring benefit 
has a value of d in these states. Finally, since the firm already restruc-
tured at date zero, it does not need to do so again when state M 
arises.38 
With this framework in hand, we can analyze the restructur-
ing/workout decision of a rational, profit-maximizing firm. A firm will 
choose a workout if and only if the following condition is true: 
(pg + pm)(1 + d) + pbL – R  <  pg + pm (1 – R) + pbL – X – W 
Some simple algebra reduces this inequality to a formula that we 
can easily interpret. A workout will occur if and only if the following is 
true: 
(1 – pb)d  < (R – W) – pmR – X 
Qualitatively, this simple model suggests that a less costly work-
out should occur, compared to a more costly but more thorough re-
structuring when: 
(a) The cost difference between a restructuring and a workout 
(R – W) is higher. This is intuitive, because it merely suggests that 
a workout is more likely to be optimal when the extra direct costs 
of restructuring are high relative to a workout.39 
(b) The additional economic losses that follow from choosing a 
workout (X) are low. If, on the other hand, the failure to restruc-
ture leads to poor operating performance, then the cost of “buy-
ing time” until the state of the world is realized may be too costly. 
The data presented by LoPucki and Doherty suggest that these 
interim losses are particularly large following Delaware reor-
ganizations.40 As we will see below, taking a closer look at the 
data suggests that there is no evidence that X is positive. 
                                                                                                                      
 37 The model is flexible enough to incorporate the possibility that the workout improves 
profit between periods; this would mean that X is negative. We include this parameter because 
LoPucki interprets his data to imply that X is positive (due to Delaware’s “laissez-faire” ap-
proach in failing to require a full restructuring, subsequent profitability suffers).  
 38 For simplicity, we assume that cash flows are the same in the high and medium state. If 
we assumed that cash flows in the high state were 2 instead of 1, for example (to further distin-
guish the high from the medium state), this would have no effect on the decision to restructure, 
as the simplified inequality above would be identical. 
 39 This intuition is one of the principal arguments made by Bob Rasmussen and Randall 
Thomas in their critique of LoPucki’s initial findings. Rasmussen and Thomas, 54 Vand L Rev at 
295–99 (cited in note 22). 
 40 LoPucki and Doherty, 55 Vand at 1945 (cited in note 21). 
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(c) The probability of the medium state (pm) is low. The underly-
ing intuition is that restructuring should be undertaken now if it 
is likely to be required later in any case. When pm is low, by con-
trast, the “option value” of waiting to restructure is higher, since 
the likelihood of saving on restructuring costs (which are not re-
quired in states G and B) is higher. Note that if pm = 1, then re-
structuring is always optimal, since the expression above reduces 
to d > - W – X, which is always true.  
(d) The probability of the bad state (pb) is high. This result is 
perhaps the most important to gain an understanding of the 
firm’s venue choice decision. If the firm’s future prospects are 
poor (pb is high), then a cheaper workout alternative is likely to 
be preferred, since part of the benefits of a full restructuring (d) 
accrue only when the firm survives. The more likely the firm is to 
fail, the greater are the gains to waiting before attempting a full re-
structuring of operations. 
It is point (d) that deserves the most attention when attempting 
to interpret the results of LoPucki and Sara Kalin41 and of LoPucki 
and Joseph Doherty.42 It is apparent from the sketch of the model 
above that allowing firms the choice of a cheaper and faster workout 
alternative can increase social surplus, because some firms will benefit 
from postponing a full restructuring. More importantly, though, the 
model suggests that comparing postbankruptcy outcomes in firms that 
choose the cheaper alternative to outcomes in those that select the 
more costly alternative can be misleading. Firms that are more likely 
to underperform in the future, all else equal, will rationally select a 
cheaper, faster bankruptcy procedure, like the procedure offered by 
Delaware courts (particularly in prepackaged cases) in the 1990s. A 
higher probability of subsequent failure may result entirely from this 
selection effect, even if bankruptcy courts have no causal effect what-
soever on postbankruptcy performance. 
B. Capital Structure, Creditor Governance, and Classifying Failure 
In this Part, we push the simple framework one step further and 
consider the possibility of an agency problem that may prevent the 
firm from taking actions that maximize value. This will allow us to de-
                                                                                                                      
 41 See generally LoPucki and Kalin, 54 Vand L Rev 231 (cited in note 21). 
 42 See generally LoPucki and Doherty, 55 Vand L Rev 1933 (cited in note 21).  
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rive predictions about postdistress capital structure and shed further 
light on the empirical results we have developed thus far.43  
To be concrete, suppose management/equity holders are reluctant 
to pursue a full restructuring or liquidation at date one and will only 
do so when their hand is forced by an inability to repay debt. In other 
words, creditor control may be required to force the firm to make 
value-maximizing decisions. This agency problem might occur for a 
variety of reasons. Managers might be concerned about their reputa-
tion or the likely loss of their jobs, and would not want to risk the 
stigma of a bankruptcy filing. The equity holders they represent might 
be similarly reluctant, knowing that a Chapter 11 filing could result in 
their interests being extinguished. They might prefer to choose risky 
but inefficient actions that maximize the value of their own interest at 
the expense of debtholders.44 To represent this numerically, we assume 
that if a restructuring or liquidation is required but not undertaken at 
date one, then the expected value of the firm’s future cash flows is zero.  
Because the firm is assumed to be insolvent at date zero (thus 
implying that management must bargain with creditors to a solution), 
we assume that the capital structure and the workout/restructuring 
decision will be made to maximize total firm value based on the ex-
pectation of the firm’s future cash flows. The capital structure will be 
chosen anticipating future agency problems, namely, that management 
will avoid restructuring and liquidation whenever possible. Suppose, 
further, that the firm will be unable to pay its debts whenever these 
debts, D, exceed the present value of the firm’s future cash flows, 
which are realized at date one. To avoid unnecessary financial distress, 
we assume that the firm will choose D to be the lowest possible value 
such that management is induced to take the optimal value-
maximizing decision in all future states. 
With this in mind, consider the firm’s optimal capital structure 
decision when restructuring is preferred (that is, when (1 – pb)d  > (R – 
W) – pmR – X). If the firm restructures at date zero, then the man-
ager’s preferred action is compatible with firm value in all but state B. 
This is true because no action is required in state G, and restructuring 
                                                                                                                      
 43 For a discussion of how capital structure can be designed to achieve efficient outcomes 
in bankruptcy when a wider menu of securities are available (including secured debt, leases, and 
asset-backed securities), see Kenneth Ayotte and Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and 
Benefits of “Bankruptcy Remoteness” (unpublished manuscript 2005) (on file with authors).  
 44 It is a well-known principle in corporate finance that when firms are in financial distress, 
managers (representing equity holders) have an incentive to pursue risky projects at the expense 
of overall firm value. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 334–37 (1976). A bank-
ruptcy filing forces managers to pay more attention to the interests of firm value as a whole, 
since creditors can reject a debtor’s reorganization plan. 
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is not necessary in state M, since it was already conducted at date zero. 
This implies that the restructured firm will choose D to be slightly 
higher than L, so that the firm is forced into liquidation only in that 
state. 
If the converse inequality holds, however, and the firm opts for a 
workout rather than a restructuring at date zero, the managers’ inter-
ests diverge with firm value in states M and B at date one, because in 
state M a restructuring is optimal. This implies that the firm will 
choose D to be slightly higher than 1 – R, which by our earlier as-
sumption is higher than L.  
Thus, the expanded model yields an additional insight, which re-
sults from the benefits of creditor governance: a costly restructuring is 
optimally paired with a lower postdistress leverage ratio, while a 
cheaper workout is optimally paired with a higher postdistress lever-
age ratio. This result, like our earlier results, suggests a particular need 
for caution in interpreting differences in distress resolution as result-
ing from ineffective court procedures.  
C. Comparing the Two Perspectives 
It is important to contrast the perspective in our theoretical 
model with LoPucki’s perspective in Courting Failure as it relates to 
the prominence and efficiency of the Delaware bankruptcy court. In 
our model, the “depth” of restructuring is a choice made by the firm’s 
owners to maximize its value. A fuller restructuring, despite improving 
the firm’s future prospects, may not always be value-maximizing. The 
firm might prefer instead to implement a less costly alternative, and 
save a full restructuring for a later date. 
Because the Delaware court (and the prepackaged case more 
generally) offers the possibility of a faster, and hence less costly pro-
cedure, our model predicts that 
(a) it will attract firms that are more likely to fail upon emer-
gence, and  
(b) these firms will emerge with higher leverage than those that 
undertake a more costly restructuring. 
Taking this perspective, the choice of venue merely represents a 
forum in which the firm implements an expensive or inexpensive plan 
according to its preferences.45 The firm’s resulting success or failure, 
then, is determined only by its characteristics upon entering bank-
                                                                                                                      
 45 One could imagine other analogies that might make the point more creatively that cor-
porate debtors may select Delaware for particular reasons. For instance, though we pour hot coffee 
into mugs and cold soda into glasses, we rarely assert that glasses “fail to heat the beverage.” 
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ruptcy and the inherent cost of the procedure it chooses, which is not 
affected by the court itself.  
Our approach emphasizes selection and cost as drivers of out-
come differences across courts in ways that are consistent with effi-
ciency. Professor LoPucki’s interpretation of the facts clearly implies 
causality by courts and inefficiency. That is, he concludes that outcome 
differences (such as higher refailure rates, higher postbankruptcy lev-
erage, and weaker postbankruptcy performance) must have been 
caused by differences among courts, judges, or other features of the 
bankruptcy process that are necessarily inefficient.46 We strongly dis-
pute this interpretation of the facts. We now turn to a more thorough 
examination of the existing data to determine whether such strong 
determinations of causality and inefficiency are warranted. 
D. Taking a Second Look at the Data 
With these insights in hand, we will now reexamine some of the 
main evidence for Delaware’s deficiency, as reported in Professor 
LoPucki’s existing research and summarized in Courting Failure. As 
our model points out, one cost of attempting a faster but (perhaps) 
less thorough Delaware reorganization is the additional losses that 
might occur due to the decision to postpone operational changes in 
the company (represented by the parameter X in our model). These 
additional losses, if substantial, would lead to the conclusion that the 
Delaware bankruptcy procedure must have been value-destroying.  
As evidence for this conclusion, LoPucki documents the poor 
postbankruptcy operating performance of the nine Delaware firms 
that refiled for bankruptcy in the interim periods between the two 
filings. On average, the cumulative operating losses of these firms av-
eraged 18 percent of asset value. Professor LoPucki interprets these 
results as strong evidence that the costs of multiple bankruptcies are 
too costly to be justifiable by rational choice: 
Those [Delaware refilers’] operating losses averaged 18 percent 
of the entire value of the company. . . . Operating losses are gen-
erally hard cash, and prepetition financial statements generally 
overvalue the companies’ assets, so the 18 percent figure is a very 
                                                                                                                      
 46 For example, LoPucki and Kalin interpret the data the following way: “The extraordi-
nary high failure rate that resulted from these reorganizations suggests a lack of ‘efficiency’ in 
the Delaware process at that time—the very time in which the Delaware court was establishing 
its dominance.” LoPucki and Kalin, 54 Vand L Rev at 264 (cited in note 21). Similarly, with re-
spect to postbankruptcy leverage ratios, “the Delaware bankruptcy court’s laissez-faire approach 
to confirmation may not provide sufficient encouragement for firms to reduce their leverage 
ratios.” Id at 265. In Courting Failure itself, LoPucki is characteristically more strident, claiming 
that Delaware “was actually destroying companies” (p 118). 
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conservative estimate of the losses that occurred between bank-
ruptcies. . . . To calculate the losses from failed reorganization one 
would also have to add the cost of the additional bankruptcy. Re-
filing was far too expensive to be efficient (p 109).  
It is important to recognize the implicit assumptions behind this 
strong conclusion. In order to interpret these facts as evidence of a 
faulty Delaware bankruptcy procedure and inefficient decisionmak-
ing, one would have to assume all of the following: 
(a) The accounting measures of losses reflect true economic 
losses (rather than paper losses); 
(b) These losses occurred after the firm emerged from bank-
ruptcy (rather than merely being recorded after the emergence); 
(c) These losses would not have occurred if a different bank-
ruptcy venue were chosen. 
A closer look at the sources of the operating losses in these nine 
firms, however, reveals that there is reason to doubt each one of these 
claims. Below, we present a summary of the postbankruptcy perform-
ance of the nine Delaware refilers reported by LoPucki. The data re-
veal a striking pattern. Nearly all of these reported losses are driven 
by write downs of intangible assets and amortization of postreorgani-
zation goodwill.  
To explain the importance of this finding, a bit of background is 
required. Postreorganization firms use a procedure called “fresh start 
reporting” to create a new set of financial statements after reorganiz-
ing. Tangible assets are recorded at their market values, and an intan-
gible asset is created to reflect the firm’s estimate of the difference 
between the market value of the firm and the liquidation value of its 
assets. This goodwill “asset” is amortized over a period of years. Oper-
ating profits in LoPucki’s work and LoPucki and Doherty’s work are 
reported after this amortization expense is deducted.47 
Although this goodwill amortization expense is standard account-
ing practice, it is hard to attach much economic significance to its 
value, because the goodwill amount and the amortization schedule are 
substantially left to the firm’s discretion. Recognizing these defects, 
both practitioners and academics commonly choose a different meas-
ure of profitability called EBITDA, in which depreciation and amorti-
zation are added to operating profit to avoid this unnecessary distor-
                                                                                                                      
 47 LoPucki, 54 Vand L Rev at 331 (cited in note 21); LoPucki and Doherty, 55 Vand L Rev 
at 1933 (cited in note 21). 
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tion.48 EBITDA is sometimes considered a rough proxy for cash flow 
because it excludes such noncash charges. 
In the table below, we present postbankruptcy performance meas-
ures from the nine Delaware cases that emerged from bankruptcy be-
tween 1991 and 1996 and subsequently were refiled.49 The notes col-
umn describes the reasons behind the large losses that some of the 
firms reported in a given year. 
                                                                                                                      
 48 EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. The 
operating profit measure used in LoPucki’s studies is sometimes called EBIT (earnings before 
interest and taxes). See Steven N. Kaplan and Richard S. Ruback, The Valuation of Cash Flow 
Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 50 J Fin 1059, 1063, 1066–67 (1995). Financial covenants on 
loans are more commonly based on EBITDA than on EBIT. Other academic studies on post-
bankruptcy performance have used this EBITDA measure as well. See, for example, Edith 
Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J Fin 3, 8 (1995). 
 49 So that our ratios make sense, we included only annual data from 10-K statements. Data 
from 10-Q statements were similar. Assets are the “assets before first filing” measure as reported 
in LoPucki, 54 Vand L Rev at 257–58 (cited in note 21). EBITDA is the operating profit as re-
ported by LoPucki plus depreciation and amortization. Adjusted EBITDA is sales less cost of 
goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses. Where such categories were not 
explicitly provided in the 10-K, all costs not specifically associated with depreciation, amortiza-
tion, or write downs of assets were included as a conservative approximation. Amounts are in 
thousands of dollars. 
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Firm Name Year 
Operating 
Profit 
(EBIT) EBITDA 
Adjusted 
EBITDA 
EBIT/     
Assets 
EBITDA/   
Assets 
Adjusted 
EBITDA/   
Assets Notes   
           
Memorex 1 1993 -80,423 -36,313 -5,025 -4.6% -2.1% -0.3% The amortization of 
postreorg goodwill 
totaled 23,460 
(29% of operating 
losses). 
           
Spectravision 1994 -229,386 -178,852 18,567 -37.6% -29.3% 3.0% 
 1993 3,205 47,308 47,957 0.5% 7.7% 7.9% 
 avg    -18.5% -10.8% 5.4% 
In 1994, the 
company wrote 
down the value of 
hotel contracts by 
196,256 (86% of 
1994 operating 
losses). 
           
Cherokee 1994 -17,136 -112 -112 8.0% -0.1% -0.1%    
           
Memorex 2 1996 -207,474 27,557 12,478 -18.2% 2.4% 1.1% 
 1995 -84,860 50,311 33,048 -7.5% 4.4% 2.9% 
 avg    -12.8% 3.4% 2.0% 
In 1996, amortiza-
tion of postreorg 
goodwill was 
224,456 (108% of 
operating losses). 
           
Westmoreland  1995 -95,960 -81,057 2,403 -36.1% -30.5% 0.9% 
Coal 1996 -2,388 -52 -2,312 -0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 
 avg    -18.5% -15.3% 0.0% 
In 1995, the 
company wrote 
down the value of 
assets by 66,623 
(69% of operating 
losses). 
           
Harvard  1993 -9,375 -6,783 -6,783 -1.9% -1.3% -1.3%    
Industries 1994 37,619 39,203 39,203 7.5% 7.8% 7.8%    
 1995 38,469 41,455 41,455 7.6% 8.2% 8.2%    
 1996 -9,474 5,838 5,838 -1.9% 1.2% 1.2%    
 avg    2.8% 4.0% 4.0%    
           
TWA 1994 -279,494 -96,211 42,638 -10.4% -3.6% 1.6% 
        
        
Recorded 175,100 
in write downs and 
other one-time 
charges (63% of 
operating losses). 
United  1992 -16,896 -10,147 -10,147 -7.5% 4.5% 4.5%    
Merchants 1993 -11,160 -9,369 -9,369 -5.0% 4.2% 4.2%    
 1994 -11,314 -9,591 -9,591 -5.0% 4.3% 4.3%    
 1995 -6,663 -5,195 -5,195 -3.0% 2.3% 2.3%    
 avg    -5.1% 3.8% 3.8%    
           
Grand Union 1998 -132,500 70,600 70,600 -9.5% 5.1% 5.1% 
 1997 -65,300 122,800 122,800 -4.7% 8.8% 8.8% 
 1996 -27,600 116,200 116,200 -2.0% 8.3% 8.3% 
 
avg    -5.4% 7.4% 7.4% 
Cumulative 
amortization of 
excess reorg value 
was 290,300 
between 1996 and 
1998 (129% of 
cumulative operat-
ing losses). 
           
Average of averages    -9.0% 2.3% 1.8%    
We report two new measures of profitability that avoid the dis-
tortion caused by noncash charges. The first, EBITDA, is operating 
profit plus depreciation and amortization. As noted, this measure cor-
rects for the distortions caused by the arbitrary choice of postreor-
ganization goodwill. As these data show, several of the largest re-
ported losses were driven entirely by amortization of postreorganiza-
tion goodwill. In two of the cases, Memorex 2 and Grand Union, these 
goodwill amortization expenses were more than 100 percent of the 
reported operating losses. Using EBITDA as a measure of profitabil-
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ity, these firms actually earned a positive profit between refilings. 
Overall, when EBITDA is used as a measure of profit, the average 
Delaware refiling firm lost an average of only 2.3 percent of its pre-
bankruptcy asset value per year.  
The second measure, which we call adjusted EBITDA, adds back 
the value of asset write downs in addition to depreciation and amorti-
zation. This measure allows us to further understand the true drivers 
of the reported postbankruptcy performance of these nine firms. Al-
though asset write downs are certainly more likely to represent true 
economic losses than amortization of reorganization goodwill, it is 
highly unlikely that large abnormal write downs of asset values re-
sulted from value-destroying activity that occurred entirely in the pe-
riod in which the losses are recorded. More likely, large write downs 
would recognize economic losses resulting from decisions made in 
past periods. 
As our adjusted EBITDA-to-total assets ratio demonstrates, all 
of the large single-period losses (periods in which operating losses 
were more than 10 percent of asset value) resulted from either amor-
tization or large write downs of assets. When these losses are excluded, 
only three of the nine firms suffered losses in the period between 
bankruptcies, and only one of the firms (United Merchants) lost more 
than 1 percent of asset value in an average year. On average, the ad-
justed EBITDA-to-total assets ratio for the Delaware refilers is a 
positive 1.8 percent of prebankruptcy assets per year.50 
Our analysis of the nine Delaware failures suggests several con-
clusions. First, the operating loss measure (EBIT) reported by 
LoPucki51 and by LoPucki and Doherty52 is an extreme overstatement 
of any value loss attributable to the Delaware bankruptcy process. 
Even if the postbankruptcy performance of these nine firms were per-
fectly foreseeable in advance, we could not conclude that the decision 
to emerge from bankruptcy was economically inefficient. Attributing 
any postbankruptcy underperformance to causality by some feature of 
the Delaware bankruptcy process is even more speculative.53    
                                                                                                                      
 50 In interpreting these figures, we do not mean to suggest that any of these nine firms 
were “good” performers. Naturally, because all of these firms filed a second time for Chapter 11, 
it is likely that any profitability measure would be below average if compared to industry peers. 
Considering, however, that these nine firms were the worst performers of the group emerging 
from Delaware in the 1991–1996 period, the losses are surprisingly moderate.  
 51 LoPucki, 54 Vand L Rev at 336–38 (cited in note 21).  
 52 LoPucki and Doherty, 55 Vand L Rev at 1942–44 (cited in note 21).  
 53 Rasmussen reaches a very similar conclusion by conducting careful anecdotal case stud-
ies of each of the bankruptcies in question. See generally Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt 
(cited in note 23).  
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Second, the results directly contradict Professor LoPucki’s claim 
that these losses “are generally hard cash.” Instead, nearly all of the 
reported losses are driven by noncash charges whose economic sig-
nificance is dubious. In addition, the fact that many of the large re-
ported operating losses were driven by asset write downs, not post-
bankruptcy operations, supports the notion that preexisting conditions 
of Delaware filers (and of prepackaged cases) are as important a 
driver of refiling patterns as decisions made after the filing.  
E. Is There a Bias against Delaware? 
The above analysis and examples suggest that the economic 
losses of companies emerging from Delaware are both overstated and 
wrongly attributed to the Delaware bankruptcy process. But LoPucki’s 
performance measure also is likely to overstate the losses in cases 
from other bankruptcy courts. It might therefore seem that LoPucki 
still can claim that Delaware firms perform substantially worse than 
firms emerging from other courts. Is there a reason why a comparison 
of postbankruptcy performance is likely to be biased toward finding 
that the Delaware bankruptcy process was inefficient?  
For several reasons, the answer is yes. As our theoretical model 
suggests, firms choosing a faster, cheaper means of resolving distress 
are more likely to be candidates for a later liquidation. Owners might 
rationally choose to forsake an expensive restructuring, which would 
be wasted if the firm is later liquidated. This selection effect can be an 
important driver of postbankruptcy performance.54 Second, if creditor 
governance is valuable, it is rational for more troubled firms to choose 
higher postbankruptcy leverage ratios—distressed firms might be op-
timally kept “on a short leash” to shut down overspending on projects 
that are later determined to be unprofitable.55 
                                                                                                                      
 54 Professor LoPucki has attempted to refute these points in prior work by comparing 
Delaware and non-Delaware filers along observable measures such as size and leverage. Al-
though such simple observable measures might identify an obvious selection effect, the failure to 
find obvious observable differences driving both the filing decision and refailure does not rule 
out the presence of selection. In most empirical studies of this kind, researchers recognize the 
possibility of unobservable differences and use econometric techniques (such as instrumental 
variables) to eliminate them. In our own research, we have found such an approach to be diffi-
cult, in part due to the small sample size and the lack of plausible instruments. Given the inher-
ent difficulty involved, we believe it is sensible to acknowledge the possibility that unobservable 
selection could be driving the results, especially because we have identified a plausible explana-
tion for it in our theoretical model, and anecdotal evidence from practitioners indicates that the 
“tougher” cases often go to Delaware to take advantage of the expertise of its judges. 
 55 The Spectravision case (one of the Delaware refilers) illustrates this point. The company 
provided pay-per-view movie services to hotel chains through an outdated technology. After its 
first prepackaged filing, Spectravision converted to a newer, more modern technology that used 
satellites to deliver movies to hotel rooms. This new technology turned out to be a failure, run-
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Consistent with our model, LoPucki and Doherty find that Dela-
ware firms do emerge with higher leverage than non-Delaware firms. 
This insight is important. As our data below will demonstrate, all of 
the metrics used by LoPucki and Doherty to argue that Delaware 
bankruptcies cause poor postbankruptcy performance are distorted by 
leverage.  
1. Measures based on a second bankruptcy filing. 
When firms emerge from bankruptcy or complete workouts, they 
rarely, if ever, choose an all-equity capital structure, despite the fact that 
this choice would minimize the likelihood of refailure.56 Instead, firms 
often choose high levels of debt that make a second bankruptcy a dis-
tinct possibility. Our simple model points out one reason why firms 
might choose high leverage after resolving distress—this choice may be 
required to prevent the future overspending, risk-seeking tendency of 
management and equity. This benefit-of-creditor governance has so far 
been ignored in the venue choice debate. Because firms reorganizing in 
Delaware emerge with higher leverage, a second bankruptcy is certainly 
more likely, controlling for the firm’s postbankruptcy profitability. To 
see this as a failure, however, would be a mistake. The logic behind our 
model suggests that if firms were forced to emerge from bankruptcy 
with no debt and to remain all-equity-financed after bankruptcy, they 
would certainly refile with lower probability. Importantly, however, sig-
nificant firm value might be lost because the potential for effective 
creditor governance would be lost.57 This governance lever should be 
                                                                                                                      
ning over budget and behind schedule, and many hotels were reluctant to make the conversion. 
Though it sought to restructure its bonds to avoid a second filing, it was unsuccessful, and a cash 
shortage forced the company into Chapter 11 again in 1995. In its second bankruptcy, it was 
acquired by On Command, one of its competitors. On Command converted hotels with Spectrav-
ision technology to its own more cost-effective technology. Had leverage been lower, Spectravi-
sion might have continued to pursue the risky technology indefinitely, particularly given equity-
holders’ tendency to pursue risky projects at the expense of firm value. Spectravision is also 
discussed in Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen’s critique of Courting Failure. See generally 
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Beyond Recidivism (unpublished manuscript 2005) 
(on file with authors). 
 56 For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 
Wash U L Q 811, 815–17 (1994). 
 57 One justification for the leveraged buyout (LBO) wave in the late 1980s was that debt 
helps solve a firm’s “free cash flow” problem. Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the 
Privatization of Bankruptcy, 2 J Applied Corp Fin 35, 44 (Spring 1989) (describing the potential 
benefits and pitfalls of leveraged buyouts and the strategy behind them). By committing cash for 
debt repayment, overspending can be curbed significantly. Though the LBO wave resulted in 
numerous bankruptcies in the early 1990s, a study by Gregor Andrade and Steven Kaplan finds 
that the costs of purely financial distress are moderate and that the LBO wave overall created 
value. See Gregor Andrade and Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) 
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J Fin 1443, 
1444 (1998).  
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particularly important in firms that have filed for bankruptcy once, be-
cause the future prospects of these firms are likely to be in doubt. In 
short, refailure is not a useful measure of the effectiveness of a bank-
ruptcy procedure. Moreover, using this measure to compare across 
courts is biased against Delaware, whose process allows firms to emerge 
with higher leverage.58 
2. Measures based on net income. 
As taught in most corporate finance textbooks, net income is a 
measure of firm performance that is skewed downward by leverage.59 
Because net income is reported after interest expense, higher debt will 
lead to lower net income for a given quality of the firm’s performance. 
The main measure LoPucki and Doherty use to argue for Delaware 
firms’ “astonishingly poor” performance is net income divided by assets.  
Similarly, LoPucki and Doherty report that Delaware reorganiza-
tions are significantly more likely to be classified as “failures.” A reor-
ganization is classified as a failure if (a) a second Chapter 11 is filed, 
or (b) the firm merges or is acquired after negative earnings are re-
corded. Because firms reorganizing in Delaware chose to emerge with 
higher leverage, their mergers are more likely to be classified as fail-
ures according to this metric, since net income is more likely to be 
negative for a given operating performance. 
3. Measures based on operating profit (EBIT). 
Though less obviously so, operating profit (EBIT) is also biased 
against firms that seek to emerge from bankruptcy with higher lever-
age. As our earlier discussion highlights, amortization of postreorgani-
zation goodwill is an important driver of operating profit of reorgan-
ized firms. A study by Reuven Leuhavy finds evidence suggesting that 
firms with higher postbankruptcy leverage are significantly more 
likely to overstate their fresh start equity values.60 This, in turn, in-
creases amortization expense and reduces reported operating profit. 
Leuhavy suggests that the rationale for this bias may be the incentive 
to achieve confirmation of a plan by overstating the firm’s solvency.61  
                                                                                                                      
 58 To the extent that other courts have begun to replicate Delaware practices, these differ-
ences may diminish somewhat over time. 
 59 See, for example, Robert C. Higgins, Analysis for Financial Management 9 (Irwin/McGraw-
Hill 6th ed 2001). 
 60 See Reuven Leuhavy, Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Com-
panies Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 7 Rev Accounting Stud 53, 54–55 (2002). 
 61 Id at 69. 
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F. Do Delaware Reorganized Firms Really Underperform after 
Bankruptcy? 
The following table presents postbankruptcy performance data 
from firms emerging from Chapter 11 between 1991 and 1996, drawn 
from LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database.62 
 
Net Income/ 
Assets 
Operating Profits/ 
Assets 
EBITDA/Assets 
Adjusted 
EBITDA/Assets 
Court 
Average of  
Averages 
N 
Average of  
Averages 
N 
Average of  
Averages 
N 
Average of  
Averages 
N 
Delaware -11.5% 13 -3.8% 13 10.9% 13 11.6% 11 
SD NY -2.8% 10 4.0% 10 11.0% 10 9.8% 9 
Other Courts -3.5% 37 6.1% 37 11.9% 37 12.3% 26 
 
Although the data is not an identical match to the data used in 
LoPucki and Doherty, the common statistics are substantially similar. 
The difference between Delaware and “Other Courts” is most pro-
nounced for the net income measure and the operating profit meas-
ure, which are distorted by leverage and goodwill amortization. No-
tice, however, when we calculate performance measures that are inde-
pendent of these biases, the differences between Delaware and Other 
Courts becomes negligible (no more than 1 percent of total assets). A 
statistical test of the performance data reveals that such a small differ-
ence in means could easily be driven by random chance.63   
G. Conclusion 
Based on a simple theoretical model and a second look at the ex-
isting empirical evidence from Chapter 11 filings, we find no evidence 
to support the conclusion that the Delaware bankruptcy process is 
inefficient, or that competition for bankruptcy cases is socially de-
structive, as Professor LoPucki asserts in Courting Failure. All of the 
available evidence reported in the existing empirical research, after 
more careful scrutiny, is completely consistent with the hypothesis that 
                                                                                                                      
 62 We selected all firms emerging from bankruptcy between 1991 and 1996 with confirmed 
plans and matched them to data from COMPUSTAT for up to five years following their emer-
gence from bankruptcy. Although the original list of firms was larger, COMPUSTAT data was 
only available for sixty of the firms, which generated a total of 287 observations. Adjusted 
EBITDA is calculated as: sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative 
expenses. 
 63 When we tested for differences in means of the EBITDA measures between Delaware 
and Other Courts, the p-values are above 0.8. This suggests that a difference of such small magni-
tude could easily be generated by chance if in fact there is no intrinsic difference between the 
postbankruptcy performance of firms emerging from Delaware and those emerging from Other 
Courts.  
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venue choice in bankruptcy has been welfare-enhancing and made in 
the interests of overall firm value-maximization. The Delaware bank-
ruptcy courts, due to their faster handling of cases and lack of inter-
ference in the firm’s decisionmaking process, offer firms a valuable 
option that is not available in other venues. To the extent that Dela-
ware judges have particular expertise in handling large, complicated 
reorganizations, as anecdotal evidence suggests, such gains from venue 
choice are even larger. Similarly, prepackaged cases offer firms an op-
portunity for a quick, low-cost debt restructuring that avoids the direct 
and indirect costs of a needlessly extended stay in bankruptcy. These 
cost-saving options, however, are most valuable to firms whose future 
viability is most uncertain. Moreover, it is exactly these firms that 
benefit the most from creditor governance, the exercise of which may 
require a second trip to bankruptcy.  
Our analysis suggests the importance of finding better metrics to 
measure whether bankruptcy outcomes can be legitimately labeled as 
“failures” or “successes.” In addition, given that venue choice is any-
thing but a random process, caution should be exercised in attributing 
causality of outcomes to bankruptcy courts rather than to the condi-
tions of the companies that choose them. Future empirical research 
related to the issues raised in Courting Failure should focus squarely 
on the amount of firm value that is either created or destroyed during 
the bankruptcy process, with an eye on establishing causality in a more 
convincing way. Given the difficulty in establishing accurate measures 
of firm value when firms are highly distressed, and the inherent small 
sample size problems associated with large Chapter 11 bankruptcies, 
this is by no means an easy task.  
III.  IS (DELAWARE) VENUE SHOPPING PERNICIOUS? 
The analysis thus far shows that the data LoPucki offers as evi-
dence of a breakdown in the Delaware courts may actually demon-
strate precisely the opposite. If a thoroughgoing restructuring is not 
the optimal strategy for every financially troubled firm—and, we have 
argued, it isn’t—postbankruptcy losses and a subsequent liquidation 
or refiling may reflect an effective bankruptcy process rather than a 
failure. 
To further assess which view of the data is more plausible—
LoPucki’s skeptical account or our more optimistic alternative—we 
turn in this Part to LoPucki’s theoretical explanation for the alleged 
breakdown in the bankruptcy courts. In his theoretical account, the 
behavior of Delaware and now other U.S. bankruptcy courts is best 
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explained as an example of pernicious forum shopping, a claim he 
supports by identifying seven issues that reflect corruption in the 
bankruptcy courts.64 In the first section of this Part, we investigate 
LoPucki’s forum-shopping claims and suggest several reasons why it is 
unlikely that Delaware and other courts focus almost exclusively on 
the interests of the debtor’s managers and attorneys. In the section 
that follows, we offer evidence suggesting, among other things, that 
experience rather than insidious forum shopping was a major factor in 
Delaware’s popularity in the 1990s. 
A. Pernicious versus Beneficial Venue Shopping 
LoPucki introduces his brief against Delaware by describing 
Delaware’s efforts to attract business in other areas. “Despite its on-
shore location,” he writes, “the state of Delaware is a haven, engaged 
in many of the same businesses pursued by offshore havens such as 
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands [etc]. Havens are states or countries 
that turn lawmaking into a business and prey on their neighbors” (p 
51).65 As examples of Delaware’s “exploitation” of other states, he cites 
its status as the most popular state of incorporation, its efforts to at-
tract credit card issuers, its legislation authorizing “asset protection 
trusts,” and finally its prominence as a venue for large scale corporate 
reorganizations (pp 53–56). 
In classic muckraking fashion, LoPucki lumps the examples to-
gether, and in doing so suggests that they are equally troubling. But in 
reality (as LoPucki implicitly acknowledges much later in the book, by 
offering a slightly less breathless analysis of Delaware’s role in bank-
ruptcy) (pp 240–43), not all forum shopping is created equal. While 
forum shopping can have undeniably deleterious effects in some con-
texts, it produces radically better results in others. The standard illus-
tration of worrisome court shopping is tobacco and other nationwide 
tort litigation.66 If the alleged victims are located throughout the coun-
try, lawyers can sue in almost any courthouse they choose. Judges or 
juries that wish to punish giant corporations, or simply to bring busi-
ness (in the form of lawyers and parties patronizing local hotels and 
restaurants) to their community, can put their courthouse on the map 
                                                                                                                      
 64 See text accompanying note 23. 
 65 For a recent attack on Delaware written in much the same spirit as Courting Failure, see 
Jonathan Chait, Rogue State: The Case against Delaware, New Republic 20 (Aug 19, 2002) (criticiz-
ing, in addition to Delaware’s efforts to attract corporations and credit card banks, the tolls on I-95). 
 66 Todd Zywicki provides a detailed exploration of the mass tort example and other cur-
rent and historical examples of court shopping in a forthcoming review of Courting Failure. Todd 
J. Zywicki, Is Forum-Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 Georgetown L J 
(forthcoming 2006). 
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by returning a few large damages awards. Unlike the benefits, which 
flow directly to the judge or jury and their community, the costs are 
borne by consumers across the nation. It is this externalization of costs, 
without an effective check, that makes for inefficient forum shopping.67 
In corporate law, the comparison that LoPucki and other partici-
pants in the bankruptcy venue debate dwell on at greatest length, com-
mentators have debated for more than thirty years whether the states’ 
efforts to attract corporations (“charter competition”) have produced 
a race to the bottom (pernicious forum shopping) or a race to the top 
(beneficial forum shopping) in state regulation. There is no need to 
rehearse the debate yet again here.68 For present purposes, it suffices 
to note that race to the bottom scholars traditionally have argued that 
managers are the ones who choose a company’s state of incorporation; 
states therefore adopt laws that are designed to keep managers happy, 
and these laws divert value from shareholders, who are the ones who 
bear the costs of inefficiently manager-friendly laws. Race to the top 
theorists, by contrast, point out that there are two potential checks on 
managers’ ability to seek, and states’ incentives to provide, manager-
centered laws: (1) a proposal by managers to reincorporate is subject 
to a shareholder vote, so shareholders have a direct say in the decision 
to shift the company’s domicile to Delaware; and (2) the takeover 
market, the market for capital, and other market forces will punish 
companies that incorporate in states with inefficiently lax regulation. 
For several decades, much of the charter competition debate focused 
on the question whether these checks are robust enough to prevent 
managers and the states that love them from diverting value from 
shareholders. Most recently, several scholars have questioned whether 
there really is any meaningful competition, because Delaware seems 
to have a near monopoly and Congress seems to be a more serious 
regulatory competitor for Delaware than the other states.69 
                                                                                                                      
 67 Id (contrasting forum shopping in contemporary mass tort cases with the more benefi-
cial court shopping in England that predated the emergence of the common law). 
 68 LoPucki provides his own summary of the debate (pp 236–40). Further discussion can be 
found in David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line between Corporate Law and Corporate Bank-
ruptcy, 72 Tex L Rev 471 (1994), and in many other places. The leading advocate of Delaware is 
Roberta Romano, and the principal critic has been Lucian Bebchuk. See, for example, Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 Harv L Rev 1435 (1992) (examining how states can be led to adopt undesir-
able corporate policies and how federal regulation should be introduced to curtail this problem); 
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J L Econ & Org 
225 (1985) (arguing that competition among the states has produced efficiency and exploring 
why Delaware is dominant). 
 69 See, for example, Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv L Rev 588, 600 (2003) 
(arguing that federal intervention rather than competition from other states is the principal 
threat to Delaware); Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corpo-
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Market skeptic that he is, Professor LoPucki sides squarely with 
the race to the bottom theorists in the corporate law debate. But the 
more important question is how the general venue shopping analysis 
plays out in the related but different bankruptcy context. Whatever 
one thinks of the corporate competition debate, LoPucki argues, the 
checks identified by corporate scholars do not come into play in the 
bankruptcy context.70 If a debtor’s managers wish to file for bank-
ruptcy, shareholders and creditors have no say in the matter; the 
debtor’s directors can unilaterally choose whether and where to file. 
Nor do the capital markets serve as a restraint. When managers file 
for bankruptcy, the company is at the end of the line. All of the capital 
raising has already been done. As a result, the managers and bank-
ruptcy lawyers have nearly unbridled discretion to look for the bank-
ruptcy court that best—or most outrageously—serves their own inter-
ests. As always, LoPucki puts the point with a bit more verve, writing: 
The lawyers and executives who choose venues for large public 
companies—the case placers—are hard-nosed businesspeople. 
They know they have something valuable to offer: tens or hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of business for local bankruptcy prac-
titioners. They expect something in return: advantages their 
bankruptcy courts at home would not give them (p 133).  
In our view, LoPucki’s forum-shopping analysis ignores (or seri-
ously underplays) several critical checks on the ability of managers 
and their attorneys to seek a venue that promotes their interests at the 
expense of creditors and other constituencies of a troubled company. 
First, and most important, although his argument that managers do 
not face capital constraints when they file for bankruptcy may have 
been accurate in the 1980s, it has been anything but accurate for the 
past decade. Since the mid 1990s, most large corporate debtors have 
been dependent on extensive bank financing during the period imme-
diately before bankruptcy and throughout the bankruptcy case. DIP 
                                                                                                                      
rate Law, 55 Stan L Rev 679, 748 (2002) (asserting that Delaware is the only state that stands to 
benefit from chartering corporations and the only state that significantly attempts to attract 
them); id at 743–47 (asserting that Congress could compete with Delaware by creating a federal 
corporation law); Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Recon-
sidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L J 553, 555–57 (2002) (arguing that 
Delaware has a monopoly on out-of-state incorporations and that this is unlikely to change). 
 70 This argument is borrowed from Rasmussen and Thomas, who develop the point in 
detail. Rasmussen and Thomas, 54 Vand L Rev at 290 (cited in note 22). Unlike LoPucki, Ras-
mussen and Thomas exempt prepacks from the analysis, based on the fact that a debtor’s manag-
ers negotiate the terms of the prepack in advance with creditors, whose support is necessary for 
the prepack to be approved. For a critique of the distinction, see Skeel, 54 Vand L Rev at 326–28 
(cited in note 22). As suggested below, we suspect that there actually is a very significant check 
on the venue choice in many cases: the DIP financer.  
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financing is now the most important corporate governance lever in 
Chapter 11.71 DIP financers seem to influence the decision where to 
file for bankruptcy, and, more importantly, they use the DIP financing 
agreement to exert significant control over the direction of the Chapter 
11 case. This influence takes a wide range of forms, including, among 
other things, insisting that the company bring in a chief restructuring 
officer, including explicit directives to sell assets or restructure quickly, 
and metering the company’s access to capital in order keep the debtor 
on a tight leash.72 
The banks that serve as DIP financers aren’t in the habit of sim-
ply throwing money away. It is therefore unlikely that they would sit 
idly by while a debtor’s managers and their attorneys directed the case 
to a venue that let managers stick around when they should be ousted 
and paid the debtor’s bankruptcy lawyers and other professionals ex-
orbitantly large amounts of money. In cases where the company de-
pends on a DIP lender for financing, one suspects that managers will 
be permitted to remain in place only if there is a good reason for their 
presence and that the debtor’s attorneys and other professionals re-
ceive New York rates because the lender is persuaded that the rates 
(and retaining the attorneys who insist on them) are justified. 
The second check is creditor voting. Each of the reorganizations 
that later refiled was approved by a vote of the debtor’s creditors. 
Creditor voting is not a perfect check against potential bankruptcy 
abuses, of course. Because creditors do not vote until the debtor pro-
poses a reorganization plan, the vote does not protect them from deci-
sions that favor the debtor’s managers or attorneys at their expense 
earlier in the case. During the 1980s, many commentators believed 
that courts’ willingness to repeatedly extend the debtor’s exclusive 
right to propose a reorganization plan not only enabled debtors to 
divert value from creditors, but also may have distorted the creditors’ 
vote. A debtor’s implicit threat to drag the case out, on this view, may 
have pressured creditors to approve plans they might otherwise have 
rejected.73 One of the most striking qualities of the Delaware cases, by 
contrast, as we have seen, is that they are significantly faster than 
cases elsewhere, which suggests that the creditors’ vote is not distorted 
                                                                                                                      
 71 See, for example, David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Gov-
ernance in Chapter 11, 152 U Pa L Rev 917, 919 (2003) (describing DIP financing and perform-
ance-based compensation as the two most important governance levers in many cases). 
 72 See, for example, David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing, 25 Cardozo L Rev 1905, 1906–07 (2004). For a detailed list of the provi-
sions DIP lenders use to exert control, see Harvey R. Miller, et al, Debtor Dispossessed: The Rise 
of the “Creditor-in-Possession” and Chapter 11 Asset Sales: Does Chapter 11 Have a Future for 
Debtors? 13–16 (unpublished manuscript 2005) (on file with authors). 
 73 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis L Rev 729. 
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in this fashion in Delaware. This and the fact that creditors approved 
the reorganization plans in the cases LoPucki examined suggest that 
the creditors, like the debtor and its attorneys, concluded that the plan 
was the best way forward. 
Elsewhere in Courting Failure, LoPucki argues that Delaware 
permits a debtor’s managers to sell assets at inefficiently low prices, 
and that the managers arrange side payments such as continued em-
ployment or consulting agreements with the purchasers of the assets.74 
Even if LoPucki were correct that Delaware permits excessively quick 
sales, the asset sale cases would not speak to LoPucki’s findings about 
repeat Chapter 11 filings, since the § 363 sales do not lead to a tradi-
tional reorganization.75 These are different cases, in other words, than 
the cases in LoPucki’s original analysis. More importantly, we have 
significant doubts about LoPucki’s characterization of § 363 sales 
practices. So long as the managers themselves (or the DIP financers, as 
discussed in the next Part) are not the buyers of the assets, open auc-
tion procedures seem likely to ensure that the assets are bought by the 
highest valuing bidder. In effect, an open auction is a substitute for a 
direct vote by creditors. Although one can quibble with the sales con-
ducted in a few cases, courts have developed auction procedures that 
seem defined to balance the need for a prompt sale before the value 
of the assets deteriorates, on the one hand, with the need to conduct a 
thorough, open auction, on the other.76 
The checks we have just described are not perfect. But the exis-
tence of these correctives raises serious doubts about the suggestion 
that a debtor’s managers and lawyers can use the venue choice to 
benefit themselves and destroy otherwise healthy companies. 
B. Another Explanation for Delaware: Judicial Expertise 
Drawing on theory and recent developments in Chapter 11 prac-
tice, the last section argued that a debtor’s managers and lawyers have 
far less wiggle room than Courting Failure suggests. This raises an ob-
vious question: if large corporate debtors’ fondness for Delaware in 
                                                                                                                      
 74 LoPucki contends that managers “announce their attention to sell only at the last min-
ute,” in order to “deliver a company to themselves or their accomplices at a bargain price” 
(p 169). He goes on to suggest that the managers do not usually purchase the companies them-
selves; rather, the “debtor’s managers get some kind of publicly announced payoff—in the form 
of employment or consulting contracts—from the buyer” (p 174). 
 75 For a general discussion of § 363, see Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy 182–87 
(Foundation 3d ed 2001). 
 76 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, for instance, has devel-
oped detailed guidelines for making the property available for inspection, conducting the auction 
and other matters related to the § 363 sale, in addition to the general notice and reporting re-
quirements set forth in Bankr R 6004 (2005).  
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the 1990s cannot be explained as a simple power grab by managers 
and lawyers, what is driving the venue choice? This section briefly re-
ports the results of our own empirical investigation into the determi-
nants of the Delaware filing decision. As we shall see, our findings 
offer a significantly different perspective on the Delaware filing deci-
sion, a perspective more consistent with the analysis of the previous 
section.77 
1. The sample. 
Our sample of corporate debtors was collected from the Bank-
ruptcy DataSource, which has records of all Chapter 11 bankruptcies 
of firms with assets of at least $50 million.78 The DataSource provides 
monthly updates on major developments in the Chapter 11 proceed-
ing, including summaries of proposed plans of reorganization, whether 
the case was prepackaged, and the dates on which plans are confirmed 
or converted to Chapter 7 liquidations. It also lists summary informa-
tion about the firm, from which we recorded the state of the firm’s 
headquarters, and the court and the judge presiding over the Chapter 
11 case. The original sample for this study consists of all such firms 
filing for Chapter 11 between 1990 and 1999 with at least $50 million 
in assets. Firms filing twice within the sample period were classified as 
separate observations.  
The Bankruptcy DataSource records were supplemented with 
firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT, using the data closest to but 
not after the date the firm filed for Chapter 11.79 In order for the firm’s 
data to be considered valid, the firm must have filed a 10-K statement 
within twenty-four months of the bankruptcy date. Because it is com-
mon for firms to forsake their SEC filings in the wake of bankruptcy, 
several observations were lost at this stage. Finally, as measures of 
bankruptcy case experience by state, we used the average number of 
                                                                                                                      
 77 The sample and findings outlined in this section are described in more detail in a com-
panion paper. See Kenneth M. Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed Companies 
Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Bankruptcy 6–8 (unpublished 
manuscript 2004) (on file with authors). 
 78 The $50 million cutoff thus gives our sample both more and marginally smaller firms 
than Professor LoPucki’s sample (whose cutoff is $220 million). The Bankruptcy DataSource is 
available online at http://www.bankruptcydata.com (visited Jan 17, 2006), through a subscription 
service. 
 79 Although the Bankruptcy DataSource provides balance sheet data, we used alternative 
sources for this and for management characteristics because the Bankruptcy DataSource often 
did not report the most recent data available prior to filing. 
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business Chapter 11 cases filed in 1997 per court for each state, as 
listed on the federal judiciary’s website.80 
Based on information from the DataSource, which was supple-
mented through newspaper searches where necessary, the outcome of 
a firm’s bankruptcy was classified as a reorganization or a liquida-
tion/sale. A reorganization was coded if the firm emerged from bank-
ruptcy as a going concern with at least part of its original operations 
intact, without being acquired by or merged with an already existing 
firm. Identifying a distinction between a liquidation and a sale was 
more subtle and required more judgment calls. Because the descrip-
tive statistics of sold and liquidated firms are similar, and since both 
sales and liquidations are quite different from the firms that success-
fully reorganize, we chose a bivariate classification system to identify 
the outcomes of cases as reorganized or not. 
Using this sample, we attempted to determine which firms are 
most likely to file for bankruptcy in Delaware and why.81 We compared 
the experience of the “home court” (based on the location of the 
company’s headquarters) of companies that filed in Delaware to that 
of the non-Delaware filers. We also considered various other attrib-
utes of the companies that did or did not file in Delaware, as well as 
the duration and outcome of the Chapter 11 cases. 
2. What steered debtors to Delaware? The findings. 
For present purposes, three of our findings are especially note-
worthy. The first is that the companies that file for bankruptcy in 
Delaware have significantly more secured debt than companies that 
file elsewhere. Indeed, the fraction of the debtor’s assets that are fi-
nanced with secured debt is the single strongest firm-level determi-
nant of a company’s decision to file in Delaware.82 This does not prove 
that bank lenders influenced the decision whether to file in Delaware 
or elsewhere, but the fact that the overall amount of secured debt is an 
                                                                                                                      
 80 We used the average Chapter 11 cases per state, rather than per district, because the 
numbers for many districts are too small to generate meaningful comparisons. Because Delaware 
is a single district, combining districts in other states actually exaggerates the experience of other 
filing locations.  
 81 Because Professor LoPucki and others have argued that managers seek a manager-
friendly venue, we also considered managerial variables such as the size of the CEO’s stake in 
the company and the CEO’s tenure in an earlier version of the paper. See note 77. The coeffi-
cients on these variables were consistently near zero and statistically insignificant. Overall, we 
found no evidence that proxies for managerial influence had any effect on the Delaware filing 
decision. 
 82 See Ayotte and Skeel, Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? at 9 (cited in 
note 77). 
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important predictor of filing location strongly suggests that they may 
have.83 
The second finding concerns the relationship between court ex-
perience and the bankruptcy venue decision.84 The firms that filed for 
bankruptcy in Delaware came from states whose bankruptcy courts 
handled an average of 176 business Chapter 11 cases in 1997. The av-
erage experience for the companies that stayed home and filed in 
their local district, by contrast, was 205 cases. This distinction, which is 
statistically significant, suggests that corporate debtors from districts 
with an experienced court were far more likely to stay home than com-
panies from districts that have not handled as many Chapter 11 cases. 
To put the finding in more concrete terms, the coefficient of the ex-
perience variable in our regression analysis implies that a firm head-
quartered in a state that is twice as experienced would be 11.9 percent 
less likely to file its case in Delaware, all else equal. In corporate law, 
the experience and expertise of Delaware’s state court judges is often 
cited as one of the most important factors in Delaware’s success in 
attracting corporations to the state. Our analysis strongly suggests that 
these same factors played an important role in Delaware’s popularity 
as a bankruptcy venue for large corporate debtors in the 1990s. 
Finally, our analysis confirms the general perception and other 
researchers’ findings that the Delaware bankruptcy judges handled 
cases appreciably faster than the judges in other districts. Replicating 
the estimation presented in Eisenberg and LoPucki’s original article, 
but using our broader sample of Chapter 11 cases, we find that Dela-
ware cases are 168 days faster than cases elsewhere, a speed effect that 
is statistically significant.85 We also find some evidence to support the 
drivers of venue choice that our model incorporates, which is consis-
tent with the Delaware speed effect. Controlling for other factors, the 
companies that file in Delaware have a lower ratio of EBITDA to As-
sets (though the effect is not statistically significant). We also find that 
firms with higher prebankruptcy EBITDA to Assets ratios take sig-
nificantly longer to reorganize. While this may seem surprising at first, 
this result is completely consistent with the logic in our model: the 
firms with better postbankruptcy prospects should rationally choose a 
                                                                                                                      
 83 Similarly suggestive is the fact that Delaware firms appear to be more likely to have a 
CEO who is a professional restructuring expert. (Our earlier analysis found a differential of 0.15 
versus 0.06.) Because bank lenders are often instrumental in replacing (or supplementing) exist-
ing managers with a restructuring consultant, this too suggests that bank lenders influence the 
decision to file in Delaware. 
 84 See Ayotte and Skeel, Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? at 7–8, 10 
(cited in note 77).  
 85 The p value of the test statistic is 0.052. 
File: 19.Ayotte (final) Created on:  1/27/2006 11:32 AM Last Printed: 1/31/2006 2:39 PM 
462 The University of Chicago Law Review [73:425 
longer, and hence more thorough, restructuring. Firms with weaker 
prospects should rationally choose a faster reorganization, which the 
Delaware court provided.86  
Overall, these findings suggest that companies may have filed for 
bankruptcy in Delaware in order to benefit from the Delaware judges’ 
experience, the speed of the Delaware process, or both. The findings 
also suggest that secured creditors may have played a role in the deci-
sion to file in Delaware. But the findings cast doubt on Professor 
LoPucki’s suggestion that the venue choice is best explained in terms 
of managers’ and bankruptcy attorneys’ pursuit of their own interests. 
IV.  MEET THE NEW BOSS: THE DIP LENDER IN FULL CONTROL 
The most puzzling omission from Courting Failure is its near si-
lence on the most important development in Chapter 11 practice over 
the past decade: the increasing influence of the debtor’s postpetition 
financer over the Chapter 11 process. As discussed in Part III.A, the 
debtor’s lenders are a crucial check on the managers’ and lawyers’ 
choice of bankruptcy court; and, as we saw in Part III.B, our empirical 
evidence strongly suggests a link between secured creditors and the 
decision to file for bankruptcy in Delaware.  
Professor LoPucki doesn’t ignore the role of DIP lenders entirely. 
“Case placers” are defined early in the book to include the “lawyers, 
corporate executives, banks, and investment bankers” who choose the 
company’s bankruptcy court (p 17).87 But the bank lenders are at most 
an afterthought. They disappear almost entirely from the analysis, and 
the occasional, cameo references tend to assume that the lenders’ in-
terests are congruent with those of the managers and bankruptcy at-
torneys who are Courting Failure’s focus (p 242). Both the much-
discussed rise of DIP financer control and the evidence that compa-
nies with more secured debt have tended to file in Delaware suggest 
that the most important issue in bankruptcy is the implications of the 
new creditor governance.  
In this Part, we consider in more detail the new role of DIP lend-
ers, and their influence on the venue decision. This Part focuses in par-
ticular on the question whether DIP lender control has tended to im-
prove Chapter 11 practice, or whether DIP lenders divert value from 
other interested parties. As we shall see, our conclusions are mixed: 
                                                                                                                      
 86 Ayotte and Skeel, Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? at 13–14 (cited in 
note 77). Like Eisenberg and LoPucki, we excluded prepacks and controlled for the book value 
of the companies in the sample. 
 87 LoPucki further explains that “[t]he beneficiaries of competition are the case placers—
the debtor’s executives, professionals, and DIP lenders” (p 138). 
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overall, the rise of DIP lender control has significantly improved Chap-
ter 11, but it also seems to have perverse effects in some contexts. 
The large companies that entered Chapter 11 in the decade after 
the Bankruptcy Code was enacted (including many of the early lever-
aged buyouts that failed) often had a large amount of unsecured debt 
and comparatively little secured debt. As a result, when they filed for 
bankruptcy, the cash generated by the business was not all spoken for, 
and the debtor could use this cash to finance the reorganization effort. 
The large companies that have filed for bankruptcy more recently, by 
contrast, have often relied heavily on secured debt prior to bank-
ruptcy, and thus have less cash to work with.88 Lenders now place tight 
restrictions on debtors prior to bankruptcy as a condition of providing 
working capital, and they use the debtor-in-possession financing 
agreement to dictate the course of the Chapter 11 case.89 By setting 
strict cash flow requirements as a prerequisite for future disburse-
ment, bank lenders can force the debtor to cut costs (as in the United 
Airlines bankruptcy) or sell assets. In some cases, they have imposed 
explicit restrictions on the case, as when lenders required that F.A.O. 
Schwarz reorganize within two months or be liquidated.90 
The empirical studies that have appeared thus far have offered 
encouraging conclusions about the influence of DIP financing on the 
Chapter 11 process. Several studies have shown that debtors with DIP 
financing are more likely to reorganize than those without, and one 
study finds an increase in the value of a debtor’s stock and public debt 
when DIP financing is approved.91 By themselves, these early studies 
do not show that DIP financing is efficient—that it improves overall 
outcomes in Chapter 11.92 But they certainly do not seem to contradict 
                                                                                                                      
 88 See, for example, Harvey R. Miller and Shai Y. Waisman, Whither Goest Chapter 11? 86 
(unpublished manuscript 2005) (on file with authors) (“Increasingly, more debtors that file under 
[C]hapter 11 have balance sheets that are encumbered by large amounts of secured debt.”). 
 89 The principal Bankruptcy Code provision governing DIP financing is § 364, which, 
among other things, authorizes the bankruptcy court to give priority status to new lending. 11 
USC § 364 (2000 & Supp 2005). 
 90 For a detailed list of the provisions used by DIP financers to assert control in Chapter 
11, see Harvey R. Miller, et al, Debtor Dispossessed: The Rise of the “Creditor-in-Possession” and 
Chapter 11 Asset Sales: Does Chapter 11 Have a Future for Debtors? 13–16 (unpublished manu-
script 2005) (on file with authors). 
 91 See, for example, Sandeep Dahiya, et al, Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy 
Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J Fin Econ 259, 270–76 (2003) (arguing that DIP financing 
increases the likelihood of successful emergence from Chapter 11); Sris Chatterjee, et al, Debtor-
in-Possession Financing 15–16 (unpublished manuscript 2001) (on file with authors) (citing 
evidence that debtor-in-possession firms successfully emerge from bankruptcy significantly more 
often than firms without financing). 
 92 The apparent success of cases with DIP financers may be a selection effect, for instance. 
DIP financers may pick the best cases, rather than produce them through their performance in 
Chapter 11. In addition, simply emerging from Chapter 11 is a very imperfect measure of the 
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the impression that DIP lenders have reined in debtors’ managers and 
their attorneys. 
Our own view is that the emergence of DIP financer control is 
generally a welcome development. To the extent they limit managers’ 
ability to entrench themselves or to dissipate assets, DIP financers are 
in effect protecting the interests of all of the company’s creditors. 
Similarly, after a debtor is reorganized and emerges from bankruptcy, 
the DIP lender is well positioned to keep the company and its manag-
ers on a short leash.  
Because they enjoy both priority and control, however, there is 
also a risk that bank lenders will expropriate value for themselves at 
the expense of the debtor’s other creditors in some cases. Two kinds of 
potential expropriation are of particular note. The first stems from the 
fact that the debtor’s DIP financing is often provided by banks who 
had already served as the debtor’s lenders prior to bankruptcy. If the 
new lenders are the same as the old, and the old loan is undercollater-
alized, the lenders may try to use the new loan to ensure that even the 
uncollateralized portion of the old loan is repaid in full.93 The most 
explicit strategy for propping up the old loan, and thus diverting value 
from other unsecured creditors, is to insist that the collateral for the 
new loan secure the old loan as well—a technique referred to as 
“cross-collateralization.”94 But there are a variety of other provisions, 
some much more subtle, that can also be used to improve the status of 
the earlier loan.95 The second form of expropriation comes in cases 
where the DIP financer also intends to purchase the debtor’s assets in 
connection with a § 363 sale prior to confirmation of a reorganization 
plan. In this case, the DIP financer has an incentive to pay as little as 
possible for the debtor’s assets.96 If the lender can use its control to 
drive down the sale price, the effect is to take money straight out of 
                                                                                                                      
success or failure of a Chapter 11 case—on this point, as should be clear, we agree with Professor 
LoPucki, though we reach this conclusion for very different reasons. 
 93 This problem is discussed in more detail in Skeel, 25 Cardozo L Rev at 1926–29 (cited in 
note 72) (noting that prepetition lenders also serve as the DIP financer nearly 60 percent of the 
time).  
 94 For a description and criticism of cross-collateralization, see generally Charles J. Tabb, A 
Critical Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S Cal L Rev 109 (1986). 
 95 The most common strategy is to structure the DIP as a “roll-up,” pursuant to which 
amounts owed under the earlier loan are paid first while the debtor is in bankruptcy. If the ear-
lier loan is undercollateralized, the roll-up can effectively convert the unsecured portions into 
secured obligations. Although the lender argues that the prepetition loan was fully collateralized, 
and thus that the roll-up does not entail bootstrapping, whether the earlier loan truly was fully 
protected is not always clear. For further discussion, see, for example, Skeel, 25 Cardozo L Rev at 
1926 & n 62 (cited in note 72). 
 96 Perhaps the most high profile recent example of a DIP financer acquisition was the 
purchase of TWA by American, which was planned prior to TWA’s Chapter 11 filing and carried 
out in bankruptcy. 
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the pockets of the debtor’s other creditors, because a lower price 
means there is less money for the creditors. 
Courts have long been aware of the first problem: the DIP 
lender’s very understandable but troublesome desire to use its new 
loan to shore up the priority of its prepetition financing. A bankruptcy 
judge who is asked to approve a DIP lending agreement that includes 
problematic provisions is in a delicate position. The debtor invariably 
needs the financing right away, and the DIP lender threatens to walk if 
the proposed agreement is not accepted as is. Despite these pressures, 
bankruptcy judges have resisted many of the most blatant forms of 
bootstrapping. Although cross-collateralization is not explicitly pro-
hibited by the Bankruptcy Code, for instance, courts rarely permit it.97 
Bankruptcy judges also have been skeptical of provisions that purport 
to waive the debtor’s right to recover preferential transfers that were 
made to the DIP lender prior to bankruptcy.98 
The threat of loan-and-control transactions is both more subtle 
and more intractable. The problem, as noted above, is that the DIP 
lender has an interest in paying as little as possible for the debtor’s 
assets. It might appear that the obvious solution is to hold an open 
auction, and thus subject the DIP lender’s bid to a market test. But the 
postpetition financer is likely to have better information than any out-
side bidder, because the bank will have thoroughly investigated the 
debtor as a precondition to making its loan, and will be monitoring the 
company’s financial condition on a continuous basis.99 The information 
asymmetry between the bank and other potential bidders creates a 
classic winner’s curse dilemma: other bidders know that, if they outbid 
the better informed bank, this probably means that they bid too 
much.100 Conducting a fully advertised auction with transparent auc-
tion procedures isn’t likely to level the playing field. As a result, out-
side bidders will either underbid or stay home, and the DIP lender 
may walk away with the assets at a bargain price. 
Notice the contrast to the complaints lodged against § 363 sales in 
Courting Failure. As noted earlier, LoPucki contends that Delaware 
enables managers to conduct quick sales that enable managers to “de-
liver a company to . . . their accomplices at a bargain price,” in return 
for which the managers get a consulting contract or job (p 169). If this 
                                                                                                                      
 97 In re Saybrook Mfg Co, 963 F2d 1490 (11th Cir 1992), is often viewed as having tolled 
the death knell on explicit cross-collateralization provisions. 
 98 See, for example, In re The Colad Group, Inc, 324 BR 208 (Bankr WD NY 2005) (refus-
ing to approve various terms in a DIP financing agreement). 
 99 See, for example, Skeel, 25 Cardozo L Rev at 1930 n 74 (cited in note 72). 
 100 The winner’s curse dilemma is described in detail in Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpay-
ment in Takeovers, 41 Stan L Rev 597, 624–25 (1989). 
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were a problem, it could plausibly be addressed with open auction 
procedures.101 So long as the court ensures a level playing field, higher 
bidders are likely to emerge if the proposed sale is based on a lowball 
bid. Bias in favor of a DIP financer, on the other hand, is a far more 
difficult problem to correct, because the DIP financer has a structural 
advantage over possible competing bidders.102 
Shifting the market test back in time and requiring that the 
debtor seek competitive bids for its DIP financing also would not 
solve the loan-and-control problem. Anticipating the handsome prof-
its it will make from acquiring the debtor’s assets at a below-market 
price, the loan-and-control financer can underbid other potential 
lenders by offering attractive terms for the DIP financing.103 In effect, 
the loan-and-control financer can treat the DIP financing as a loss 
leader, and make its real money from its subsequent acquisition of the 
debtor’s assets. This gives the loan-and-control lender a leg up against 
other potential lenders, and makes it unlikely that another lender will 
offer a superior financing package. Thus, even if the bankruptcy judge 
requires competitive bidding both for the debtor’s DIP financing and 
for the purchase of the assets, the loan-and-control lender is likely to 
profit at the expense of the debtor’s other creditors. 
It is important to keep in mind that in many cases, DIP financer 
control does not implicate either form of expropriation. This suggests 
that the most sensible strategy for correcting the distortions is simply 
to focus on the particular problem. Perhaps we should take a cue from 
Professor LoPucki and head to Washington with this Review in hand. 
Amending the Bankruptcy Code to prohibit a lender from serving 
both as DIP financer and as purchaser would sharply reduce a DIP 
lender’s ability to divert value from other creditors. But we are cau-
tiously optimistic that bankruptcy judges will themselves solve the 
loan-and-control problem without the need for congressional inter-
vention. We have already seen courts responding to the bootstrapping 
problem by prohibiting loan provisions that would give preferential 
treatment to a lender’s prepetition loan. As courts begin to focus on 
the distortions created by loan-and-control transactions, we expect to 
see efforts to protect the debtor’s other creditors from the risk of arti-
                                                                                                                      
 101 Recall that the curative effect of an open auction was discussed in Part III.A. 
 102 If the managers were actively collaborating with the bidder on the bid, or participating 
directly, their inside information could distort the bidding process much as a loan-and-control 
financer’s superior information does. But in most of the cases, the managers do not participate in 
the bid. 
 103 For a somewhat similar point, see Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 Am Bankr 
Inst L Rev 219, 227–29 (2004) (suggesting that a secured creditor might use its control to obtain 
returns that violate absolute priority). 
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ficially low sale prices. At the least, this might include a reluctance to 
approve § 363 sales that are opposed by the creditors committee; ide-
ally, bankruptcy judges will go further and move toward a blanket or 
near-blanket prohibition against purchase of the debtor’s assets by the 
debtor’s postpetition financer. 
CONCLUSION  
Courting Failure is a remarkable book on many different levels. 
Rarely does a corporate bankruptcy scholar figure so prominently in 
the debates over bankruptcy reform as did Lynn LoPucki in early 
2005. The venue reform proposal offered by Senator Cornyn was in-
spired by Courting Failure, and Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware 
found the threat to Delaware serious enough to warrant a verbal duel 
with Cornyn and LoPucki in the pages of Legal Times.104 In the aca-
demic arena, the book is required reading for anyone who teaches, 
writes, or even thinks in any serious way about American corporate 
bankruptcy. And for those who are neither politicians nor scholars, 
Courting Failure is a colorful, muckraking tour through the hugely 
important world of Chapter 11. 
In our analysis of Courting Failure, we have focused primarily on 
the heart of the book—Professor LoPucki’s claims that the Delaware 
bankruptcy court was a disastrous failure in the 1990s, that it warped 
the bankruptcy process to favor the debtor’s managers and their law-
yers over everyone else, and that Delaware’s tactics spread through-
out the U.S. bankruptcy system. LoPucki’s claim that there is now an 
international dimension to the competition is far more speculative and 
is plausible, if at all, only if he has correctly diagnosed the U.S. system.  
LoPucki’s data are impressive, and in recent years he has raised 
many of the most important questions that have been asked about the 
corporate restructuring process. Why did so many Delaware cases lead 
to subsequent Chapter 11 filings in the 1990s? Are Delaware cases 
different from cases filed in other courts? 
We have argued in this Review that, although Courting Failure 
raises the right questions and offers valuable data, LoPucki’s interpre-
tation of the data is flawed in fundamental respects. Courting Failure 
                                                                                                                      
 104 See John Cornyn, They Owe Us: Companies Seeking Bankruptcy Relief Should Face 
Creditors in Their Home Court, Legal Times 67 (June 6, 2005) (citing LoPucki as authority for 
the argument that bankruptcy’s venue rules should be changed); Joseph Biden, Give Credit to 
Good Courts, Legal Times 67 (June 20, 2005) (noting that “the real political momentum behind 
Sen. Cornyn’s argument is the advocacy” of Professor LoPucki, and describing critiques of 
LoPucki’s findings); Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts, Legal Times 58 (July 18, 
2005) (responding to Senator Biden’s column and arguing that the “option to forum shop is 
undermining the courts’ integrity”). 
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analyzes the venue choice issue through the lens of an interpretative 
framework that is a throwback to an earlier era—a time when a 
debtor’s managers and their lawyers seemed to fully control the Chap-
ter 11 practice, and when most observers assumed that the goal of the 
Chapter 11 process was to rescue a company and reorganize it into 
something like its prebankruptcy form. We have argued that this pic-
ture no longer corresponds to corporate restructuring practice, and 
that it is impossible to understand the venue choice issue or Chapter 
11 generally without appreciating how the practice has changed. 
In addition to critiquing Professor LoPucki’s empirical findings, 
our analysis made three basic points. First, a full-blown restructuring is 
not likely to be the optimal strategy for every financially troubled 
company. A quicker, less costly restructuring may be preferable under 
a variety of very plausible conditions, and for these firms, a repeat fil-
ing may not reflect a failure of the earlier Chapter 11. This insight 
provides a possible efficiency-based explanation for the performance 
of the Delaware court. Second, we pointed out that a company’s 
venue choice is subject to crucial checks, which raises further ques-
tions about LoPucki’s contention that the debtor’s managers and law-
yers have unbridled discretion to search for the court that best serves 
their own interests. Finally, we argued that the most important recent 
development in Chapter 11 is the rise of DIP financer control. Al-
though DIP lenders generally seem to improve the Chapter 11 proc-
ess, under some circumstances they may divert value from other credi-
tors. Rather than eliminating venue choice, the solution to this prob-
lem is to address it directly. 
Our own empirical analysis appears to support our conclusions 
that corporate debtors tended to choose Delaware because of the 
court’s experience, and that DIP lenders are now the most important 
decisionmakers in many cases, but we and other scholars are just be-
ginning to make sense of the dramatic changes in contemporary 
Chapter 11 practice. There is a great deal of work to be done. Both for 
Professor LoPucki’s followers and for his critics, Courting Failure is 
the place where much of the next generation of corporate bankruptcy 
scholarship should begin. 
 
